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The rise in wealth for the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia led 
to an increase in demand for more and better housing. In 
response to this rising demand, and as part of an overall 
development policy, a housing 60a1 and several housing 
objectives were identified. To attain the goal a~d 
objectives, a formal housing policy was designed and 
authorized. It involved direct and indirect assistance to 
the private sector, a subsidized financing program for new 
2 
housing construction, a serviced land program for the low 
income, and public housing. 
This thesis is an evaluation of the urban housing 
policy in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Two bases of 
evaluation 
espoused 
developing 
are utilized. The first is the Kingdom's own 
housing objectives. The second involves 
a theoretical framework which addresses the 
rationales behind housing policy. 
The required information was collected from official 
government documents. Interviews were conducted in the 
Kingdom to gather additional and unpublished information. 
Additionally, field visits to housing projects were 
conducted tn the cities of Jeddah and Riyadh. Where 
information for the Kingdom as a whole was unavailable, 
data for the city of Jeddah was utilized. 
The policy results of the evaluation show that puhlic 
sector involvement in housing is most effective when 
indirectly applied. That is, subsidies to the private 
sector and to purchasers of housing through finance 
subsidies were more successful in providing housing units 
than direct involvement through public housing. An 
important consequence of the difference in effectiveness 
between privately and publicly built housing is that poor 
households were deprived of housing benefits. 
Recommendations for future housing policy include the 
provision of housing benefits to the poor, either through 
3 
the existing, but uninhabited public housing units, or 
through earmarked transfer8, or a combination of both. It 
is 31so recommended that the existing and future status of 
public housing be realistically evaluated. Finally, it is 
recommended that the range of financing activities be 
expanded and that the private sector assistance policies be 
continued. 
for 11j ruther 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION AND REVIEW OF THE PROBLEM 
Introduction 
As the world oil situation changed during the decade 
of the 1970s, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia experienced a 
tremendous increase in wealth. In 1970, the Kingdom was 
prodncing approximately 1.32 million barrels of crude oil 
per day valued at $1.80, yielding total revenues of $334 
million annually. In 1980, the corresponding figures were 
approximately nine million barrels per day valued at over 
$30 per barrel and yielding approximately $60,000 million 
annually. (Ministry of Planning, 1980)* 
During the period from 1970 to 1983, this tremendous 
increase in wealth created a large increase in the demand 
for urban housing, which is attributable to the following 
general reasons: 
(1) A migration of foreign labor to supplement the 
*All the figures above are approximate because not all 
of the oil revenues were received by the Kingdom. Price 
and quantity also vary over a given year so end of year 
figures were used. 
2 
resident work force in executing very ambitious 
development projects. 
(2) An increase in migration toward the major 
metropolitan centers from within the country. 
(3) An increase in the expected value of housing as 
an investment, given the large appreciation of 
real estate values in general. This was further 
enhanced by the rather limited indigenous 
investment opportunities extant at the time. 
(4) A rise in housing quality expectations as the 
standard of living and incomes increased due to 
the economic changes. 
The government of the Kingdom initiated comprehensive 
development plans which included a housing policy directed 
at achieving numerical and qualitative objec.tives to be 
executed for the most part by the private sector, but with 
government assistance. 
This dissertation attempts to evaluate the Saudi 
Arabian urban housing policy by investigating the basis of 
that policy, primarily the rationales that guide housing 
investment. Another important item in this analysis of the 
Kingdon's housing policy is an evaluation of the strategies 
by which housing policy is implemented. 
The definition of housing to be used throughout this 
study shall not be restricted to dwelling units. Housing 
shall be viewed as a complex of legal, social, economic, 
3 
and political features of a society that determine number, 
size, quality, geographic distribution, environment, and 
allocation of dwelling structures (Nevitt, 1980). Housing 
policy stdll be viewed as embracing issues such as 
government expenditures, loans and loan guarantees for 
investments, zoning regulations and building codes, and 
legal provisions of property rights (Aaron, 1972). 
This thesis shall address urban housing only. This is 
not to suggest that rural housing is in any way less 
important, but rather that information availability and the 
already broad nature of the topic necessitate restricting 
the scope to housing within the urban setting. 
The remainder of this chapter shall explore the 
Kingdom's housing policy in general. It shall outline also 
the nature of the problem and the significance of the 
evaluation. Chapter II will attempt to cover the 
general literature pertaining to the general rationales 
underlying housing policies as well as general strategies 
to implement those policies. The rationales have been, for 
the most part, developed for western societies with a 
specific focus on the United States, an important 
consideration setting the context for discussing Saudi 
Arabian policy. Chapter III provides an overview of the 
Saudi policy setting both in terms of broad development 
goals and objectives and in terms of specific housing 
sector problems. Chapter IV discusses the scope and 
4 
outcomes of Saudi Arabian housing policy; and Chaptp.r V 
evaluates and analyzes that policy and provides general 
conclusions and recommendations specific to the Kingdom. 
The Problem 
Several housing sector problems emerged during the 
early stages of the accelerated development programs of the 
1970s. As recently as 1975, the following problems existed 
(MUD 1977; Ministry of Planning Reports, 1975, 1980; Kadi, 
1980): 
(1) Resources for planning, building, and maint~ining 
housing were in short supply and land speculation 
was rRmpant; 
(2) Technologies for increasing worker output had not 
been applied, nor had construction management 
skills been developed to avoid costly delays; 
(3) Labor prices dramatically increased, reflecting 
shortages of indigenous sKilled human resources; 
(4) Capital for residential construction was 
available primarily through lifetime savings. 
There existed no long-term mortgage lending and 
secondary mortgage system. This generally 
reduced the purchasing power of many households. 
To meet the growing demand, and to tackle the above 
problems, the government initiated several directives which 
5 
may be considered as the backbone of housing policy in the 
Kingdom. 
(1) Preparation of the "General Housing Project," 
which projected 34,269 public housing units to 
be built in nine urban areas; (Started in 1978.) 
(2) Execution of the "Rush Housing Projects," 
consisting of 4,752 public housing units to be 
built in the three major metropolitan areas of 
Jeddah, Riyadh, and Dammam "as soon as possible;" 
(Started in 1977.) 
(3) Formation of the Real Estate Development 
Fund (REDF)--a government finance agency designed 
to provide interest free loans for the 
construction of new housing units for 
Arabian citizens; (Started in 1975.) 
Saudi 
(4) Expansion of a land grant program 
administered by local governments for eligible 
low income citizens; 
(5) The facilitation of building material 
availability in local markets as well as price 
subsidies for some building materials; 
(6) Formation of the "Saudi Real Estate Company," 
a private corporation aided by the government 
upon its founding, in 1976, to execute real 
estate projects within the Kingdom. 
The second five-year plan (1975-80) projected the 
6 
construction of 267,000 units--68 percent of which were to 
be built by the private sector and 32 percent by the public 
sector* !o achieve this goal, the government relied on the 
directives listed above. 
It should be noted that the above directives were both 
supply and demand oriented. Supply support policies 
generally subsidize housing production or rehabilitation. 
These are manifested in the directives above, except (3) 
and (4). Demand support policies subsidize consumption of 
housing through purchasing power stimulation. These are 
manifested in dir~ctives (3) and (4). 
Specific problems resulting from Saudi housing policy 
can be summarized in the following: 
(1) Public housing projects cost more per unit than 
privately constructed units; 
(2) None of the 4,752 public housing "Rush" units 
that have been completed are inhabited; 
(3) The scope of the eXisting home financing system 
is narrow. Outside of the Real Estate 
Development Fund, which grants interest-free 25 
year loans of up to 300,000 riyals per 
household for new housing, there are no 
institutions to handle long-term finance;** 
*No quantitative housing objectives were identified in 
the first five year plan. 
**One riyal is approximately $0.30. 
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(4) The "Saudi Arabian Real Estate Company," which 
was formed with government assistance, but is 
a private sector organization, has had a limited 
role geographically even though its activities 
have been profitable, i.e., its activities have 
been primarily confined to the capital city of 
Riyadh. 
(5) The land grant program did not perform up to 
expectation, especially where low income citizens 
were concerned. Specifically, continual delays 
in the preparation and distribution of sites have 
occurred. 
The above do not necessarily imply that public 
involvement in housing has been a total failure, but rather 
demonstrate the need to understand the basis for housing 
policy (the rationales) as well as the process by which 
objectives are realized (the form of policy). 
The analysis will utilize the following approach: 
First, general rationales of public involvement in housing 
will be identified. These rationales typically involve the 
intrinsic and extrinsic effects of housing on people, such 
as efficiency in building and purchasing homes, spatial 
aspects, macroeconomic stimulation, and equity is&ucs. 
These provide a broad basis to evaluate policy. A narrower 
policy evaluation basis utilizes the Kingdom's own housing 
goal~ and objectives. General strategies for housing 
8 
support, as identified earlier, will be reviewed and 
utilized in the evaluation. 
No known studies address overall Saudi housing policy 
except for Kanoo (1971), who dealt with general house 
construction systems and architecture in Saudi Arabia and 
the Gulf States. 
Finally, the transliteration system used in this 
thesis followed the Library of Congress Arabic 
transliteration system (U.S. Library of Congress, 1945) 
except for reference names and titles, which were directly 
copied as written in the sources. 
CHAPTER II 
A R~VIEW OF HOUSING POLICY RATIONALES AND STRATEGIES 
Introduction 
This chapter attempts to lay a foundation for 
evaluating Saudi housing policy. First it addresses the 
theoretical basis for government involvement with housing. 
which will then be used to question the existence of a 
"universally" applicable set of rationales to guide housing 
policy in general. Second. it includes a review of 
strategies available to implement housing policy goals. A 
distinction shall be made between demand support and supply 
support strategies where the former implies assistance in 
the consumption of housing, whereas the latter involves 
assistance in the production and/or rehabilitation of 
housing. 
Literature Review of Rationales 
Several rationales have been explored as bases for 
government involvement with housing. 
are presented and discussed below. 
The main rationales 
10 
Eguity 
In the definition of housing utilized for this thesis, 
the allocation of dwellings is a central feature. A basic 
rationale is the existence of a "fair distribution of 
adequate housing" for a given population. The concept of 
fairness in distribution is not restricted to housing, but 
embraces a broad scope of services including food, 
clothing, medical care, education, etc. Even though it may 
be more efficient to have a welfare program providing cash 
rather than in-kind transfers, the latter type of transfer 
may be more politically and economically appropriate. 
Musgrave (1976) suggests that public concern with housing 
is based upon society's evaluation of housing expenditures 
as being "meritorious," i.e., expenditu,,:,es on so-called 
"merit" goods are viewed as being more valuable than others 
which consumers themselves would choose. Merit goods are 
not necessarily restricted to housing, but include goods 
considered to be social needs, e.g. food, medical care, 
education, etc. 
The notion of benevolent welfare interdependence 
1 
was 
i 
f (X , formalized by Mishan (1981) to be as follows: u 
j i 
X , ••• ,D) where u represents the total utility of welf~re 
of the ith individual being a function of that individual's 
i 
consumption of a given good X as well as another person j 
j 
consumption of the same good X and finally, the 
distributional structure of money income in society, D. 
11 
Given that a person's welfare is assumed to depend upon 
specific goods consumed by others, market prices do not 
necessarily 
alternatively 
insure that exchange optimum is insured; 
stated, people's freedom to buy goods 
or 
at 
market prices is not the most efficient state of affairs 
under the condition of welfare interdependence. Because 
bargaining costs do exist, it may be costly to negotiate 
consumption levels of specific "merit" goods between givers 
and receivers if cash transfers are used to redistribute 
income. For example, how are givers to be assured that 
their donations will be spent on better housing--a "merit" 
good, rather than wine--a non-merit good? Additionally, 
donors may give out less in cash if the goods to be 
distributed are not specified; and consequently, recipients 
who prefer cash transfers may be better off receiving in-
kind transfers because they would be worth more than the 
smaller amounts of donated cash. 
The point is that cash transfers are not necessarily 
the best redistributive tool in terms 
maximization, given the condition 
interdependence. 
of 
of 
welfare 
welfare 
From a political viewpoint, in-kind transfers are more 
acceptable as redistributive tools to correct social and 
economic 
visibility, 
transfers, 
inequalities primarily because of 
the ability to control or adjust 
their 
these 
and the ~bility to focus transfers on merit 
12 
goods. The classification of housing as a merit good, by 
itself, implies that investments in housing are expected to 
bring about intrinsic or internal benefits such as better 
physical and mental health. 
Internal Benefits 
The internal benefits of housing or its benefits 
regarding mental and physical health appear to be more 
intuitively acceptable rather than empirically provable. 
Kasl (1976) reviewed one hundred and seventy-eight 
multidisciplinary studies dealing with the empirical 
findings regarding the effects of various physical 
parameters of housing and the residential environment on 
behavior and on mental and physical health. The domain 
reviewed by Kasl, who is an epidemiologist, include 
sociological, social psychological, psychiatric, social-
medical, gerontological, public health, architectural, and 
urban planning empirical works on the subject. Table I 
~epresents a summary of the major categories that Kasl 
reviewed along with the predominant research designs. His 
major findings are: 
(1) There is a link between parameters of housing--
such as space, comfort, etc.--and satisfaction. 
Satisfaction, however, is likely to be sensitive 
to a household's adaptation to housing. It may 
be viewed as an outcome variable, as part of 
13 
mental health, rather than an intermediate 
variable affecting health as was assumed by some 
of the studies. 
(2) Social interaction appears to have a strong link 
with housing parameters. Substandard housing was 
shown to be not mutually exclusive of the 
existence of rich social networks, adequate 
social interaction, and mutual help. Kasl's 
review of re-housing studies indicate that the 
disruption of these social networks may be a dis-
benefit and should be included when evaluating 
possible benefits of improved housing due to 
relocation. Social interaction may be viewed 
also as an outcome variable. 
(3) Kasl emphasized that even though certain 
relationships do involve simple causal mechanisms 
(e.g. presence of rodents and rodent bites, 
presence of lead paint and probability of lead 
poisoning in young children, etc.) a relationship 
between housing parameters and chronic conditions 
was not firmly established in the extensive 
literature reviewed, primarily because 
associations between housing and health appear to 
opera~e via social variables. 
(4) Kasl's major conclusion is that there is probably 
a very significant effect of housing on health 
14 
and behavior, but that the effect is very complex 
and mediated by social and physiological 
processes of reaction, adaptation, and 
accommodation to the housing environment. 
It should be noted that Kasl's study apparently did 
not review international cases in any of the six broad 
categories except for several British studies that dealt 
with relocation effects. The relevance of international 
comparisons is illustrated in the causal chart (Figure 1). 
The conditioning variables, which are demographic, 
cultural, and personality oriented, affect the process by 
which housing affects health. International differences 
are likely to affect the cultural conditioning variables 
and thus have a likely effect on the proposed causal chain. 
The cultural element plays an important role, 
influencing the sor.ial-psychological variables which 
interact with the physical aspects of the housing 
environment. Yet, Kasl's very comprehensive review does 
have a weakness: it does not include an intercultural 
comparison of the effects of housing on health, even though 
one of his major points was that, " ••• in the long run, the 
major point to emphasize is that no intervention which 
involves housing can ever afford to neglect the social 
matrix within which housing is firmly imbedded" (Kasl, 
1977, p. 299). 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
CATEGORY 
Satisfaction 
with housing 
and neighbor-
hood 
Urban ecology 
Various para-
meters of 
housing and 
its environ-
ment (generally 
dealing with 
slums and new 
housing 
developments) 
Voluntary 
housing 
TABLE I 
* REVIEW OF MAJOR CATEGORIES DEALING WITH HOUSING EFFECTS 
DESIGNS 
Surveys, cross 
sectional design 
Isolates different 
characteristics of 
census tracts by 
pathological basis 
(obtained through 
agency frequency 
data) 
Investigates social 
interaction among 
relatives, differ-
ent studies done on 
children, the elder-
ly, and "non-homo-
geneous" popula-
tions 
Longitudinal stu-
dies looked at pre 
and post move 
effects on an ex-
perimental and a 
control group 
{those who did not 
move 
FINDINGS AND COMMENTS 
-Satisfaction with housing mainly related to space. Mediated 
by social class and strongest with lower social groups. 
-Nature of dwelling more important than location except for 
elderly and upper social classes. 
·Overcrowding, poor housing, and general disorganization (per-
centage of people living alone, etc.) correlated with higher 
rates of tuberculosis, disability, venereal diseases, infant 
mortality, and psychosis. 
-Claims put forth that urban ecology indicates geographical 
concentration of a certain pathology. Too many "intervening" 
poverty variables (e.g. race, education, income, work status, 
age, family structure, etc.) exist and introduce confounding 
and spurious errors into the data analysis and interpretation. 
·Among relatives and existing friends, physical proximity and 
social homogeneity are important. A relevant dimension of 
housing is "functional distance," i.e. contact between neigh-
bors. For older peo~le, proximity to neighbors and facilities 
are more important than for other groups. Studies dealing 
with children found that crowding was a relevant variable when 
controlling for social class and race. Kas1 claims that weak 
relationships between housing and outcome variables (health) 
are primarily due to intervening variables. 
·Consequences of rehousing were primarily related to housing 
satisfaction and positive neighborhood perceptions, but no 
effects on mental health or well being resulted. Even though 
some results i.ndicated that rehoused. groups were a little 
healthier than the control groups, the benefits did have a 
selective age group--children (Wilner 1962). Medical studies 
cited indicate that relocation, being a major life change, can 
be stressful and can have definite health consequences. 
*Adapted from Kas1 (1976, 1977). .-
Ln 
CATEGORY 
5. InvDluntary 
relocation 
(Insti tution-
alii>.ation and 
enforced 
changes due 
to ~lrban re-
ne.,.,al, high-
way cOl:struc-
tion, etc.) 
6. Environmental 
psychology 
Dr:SIGNS 
Cross sectional 
designs and 
longitudinal 
ones 
Focus on micro-
aspects, i.e. 
short range 
interaction/ 
response between 
man and built 
environment 
TABLE I (continued) 
FINDINGS AND CONHENTS 
·Longitudinal studies of the effect of institutional transfer of 
the elderly, i.e. moving from one institution to another, re-
vealed increases in mortality even though those relocations in-
volved housing comparable to or better than the previous insti-
tutional one. Cross sectional studies were claimed as not 
sufficiently accounting for spurious and confounding effects 
such as self selection, anticipation, etc. Relocation due to 
urban and highway construction revealed that relocated slum 
dwellers generally pay higher rents without necessarily ex-
periencing better housing. Grief reactions or poor adjustments 
were more likely among less educated and lower occupational 
status. Finally, it is the elderly who appear to be the most 
vulnerable to negative effects of relocation primarily due to 
previou5 (pre-relocation), extensive friendship ties and the 
conveni,:!nce to many facilities. 
·Kasl cl,lims that contributions of this field to the relevance 
of mentdl and physical health effects is limited and disappoin-
ting. I~his is primarily due to the lack of generality of the 
studies as well as to their focus on short term effects. 
.... 
'" 
___ CAUSAL SEQUENCE ===> 
OBJECTIVE PERCEIVED PROXIMATE MEDHTING OUTCOME 
ENVIRONMENT ENVIRONMENT RELATIONS PROCESS VARIABLE 
Physical Perceptions Adaptations Anemia, Diseases 
attributes of privacy, variation tension, 
of housing noise, pol- in use of blood 
unit lution, etc space pressure 
Influenced by the conditioning variables: 
r-D~E~M_O~G~R_A~P~H~I_C _______ C_U_L_T_U_R_A_L-SU~B~C~U~L~T~U~R~A~L _____ ~P_E_R_S_O_N_A_L_IT_Y __ ~ 
Age-Sex-
Income, etc.) 
(Religion/Religiosity, 
Ethnic, etc. 
Coping styles, 
needs, etc. 
Figure ~ A suggested causal chain 
illustrating housing effects 
(Source: Kasl, 1976, p. 297) 
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Grebler and Burns (1977) cited an International 
Housing Productivity Study (I.H.P.S.) based on case studies 
of housing improvement in some less developed countries 
(LDCs) and less developed regions of the United States. 
The study was conducted by a team from the University of 
California in the 1970s. Its principal hypothesis was that 
better housing can generate the following benefits: an 
increase in work productivity, higher levels of health, an 
increase in productivity (or effectiveness) of education, 
and finally, a lowered incidence of social deviance. The 
design was longitudinal (time series) involving an 
experimental and a control group for seven cases located in 
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Korea (1), Venezuela (1), Mexico (2), and the U.S.(3). Data 
was collected by survey, involving information on 
productivity from company/employment records, health 
records, health information from clinical records, and 
social deviance information from police records. Data on 
school attendance was also included. All sites experienced 
housing improvements due to rehousing. 
The empirical findings were ambiguous. Increased work 
productivity resulted in only two of the four measured 
cases. Only one out of four cases studied showed 
improvements in school attendance due to housing. Only one 
case regarding deviant behavior was studied and it showed a 
positive effect, i.e., less deviance was reported.* 
Unlike some findings mentioned by Kasl, no changes 
were in the "wrong direction," i.e., in no cases did better 
housing yield worsened conditions for the rehoused. 
However, the outcomes do not strengthen the fragile 
empirical linkages between better housjng and health. 
Several issues could have caused the ambiguities--in 
addition to the unavailability of data--such as (Grebler 
and Burns, 1977, p. 163): 
(1) Substantial lags could be involved before housing 
improvement effects become evident; 
(2) Ambiguities may have been due to changes in 
*Benefits due to housing were not estimated for all 
the sites due to data limitations. 
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densities of the residences, e • g. higher 
densities may imply a spread of communicable 
diseases and/or greater feelings of alienation 
for those rehoused. The issue of densities and 
crowding shall be addressed below. 
Fischer et al (1975) conducted an extensive review to 
evaluate current research on the effects of crowding. 
Their findings indicate that responses to crowding vary 
with expectations, functional use of space or design, 
social situation, and culture. A study by Mitchell (1971) 
was cited on crowding effects in Hong Kong. It was 
concluded that density, by itself, didn't have much of an 
effect. Additionally, Newman (1972) in his classical study 
of "defensible space" concludes that building height and 
type correlate more strongly with crime than does density. 
Problems with the density studies reviewed by Fischer 
et al (1975) include, among others, multicollinearity, 
difficulties in making in-situ comparisons on the effects 
of density, and determining the direction of causal arrows, 
i.e. experimental as well as conceptual problems were 
cited.* Some of the problems with theory included "weak" 
linkages made bet~een density at the personal versus the 
community levels. Additionally, an argument similar to 
that put forth by Kasl (1976)--as reviewed earlier--was 
*Fischer reviewed over eighty studies dealing with 
density and crowding. 
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by Fischer et a1 and stressed the view that density 
probably does have an effect which is important, but has 
not been substantiated due to the weak evidence thus far. 
Demographic and cultural elements may be more pivotal in 
explaining impacts on people. 
Finally, Schorr (1966) also conducted a very extensive 
overview of the effects of housing. He identified and 
reviewed three types of evidence: first, personal or case 
observation by testimony of slum dwellers or those who know 
them or worked with them; second, correlation studies 
performed by various academicians from various fields; and 
third, comparisons of people in different types of housing 
regarding behavior and attitudes. Schorr's conclusion 
regarding the issue is that, " ••• The type of housing 
occupied influences 
particularly if 
health, 
the 
behavior, and attitude, 
housing is desparate1y 
inadequate ••• dilapidated, or lacks a major facility." 
(1966, p. 31) However, Schorr also notes that over and 
above family influences, other influences of adequate 
housing are not empirically certain, but lack of evidence 
is not to be equated with negative evidence. 
It thus appears that a theoretical case for housing 
subsidies cannot rest on arguments of pathological outcomes 
of p00r housing by itself given the above reviews, but at 
the same time the effects of poor housing cannot be 
discounted. 
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External Benefits 
In evaluating the notion that subsidized housing will 
have spillover effects into the surrounding neighborhoods 
and beyond, the following studies were reviewed.* 
Varaday (1982) conducted a social science literature 
review of studies dealing with neighborhood spillover 
benefits, specifically, reductions in incidences of crime 
and disease, fire hazards, and increases in property 
values. Additionally, citywide and societal benefits were 
also reviewed, i.e., reduced governmental costs, reduced 
racial and economic segregation, increased overall 
productivity: and econ0mic stimulation. He dealt with 
studies from different disciplines--some of which were 
reviewed earlier (Kasl, 1976; Grebler and Burns, 1977; 
Fischer et aI, 1975). These studies primarily addressed 
reductions in the incidence of crime and disease due to 
good housing. Their research results were mixed, i.e., the 
evidence was inconclusive. 
Another spillover effect is the increase in 
desirability of an area. This is likely to be reflected in 
increases in property values of adjacent properties due to 
housing investments. This operates by reducing the 
uncertainty to invest in a given area due to brighter 
prospects that seem possible. It could affect potential 
*The spi1Jover effects are those that go beyond the 
direct user of housing. 
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direct investors, the landlords, or the ftnancial 
intermediaries whose outlouk could further stimulate 
demand. Varaday concluded that the support for the 
hypothesis related to external benefits of housing is weak, 
especially where these benefits were to be used for 
justifying new housing, even though empirical evidence 
might support the view that housing subsidies would reduce 
fire fighting expenditures. Ie was not viewed as enough 
to warrant a new public housing program, but rather to make 
a case for the establishment and enforcement of 
"reasonable" housing codes. 
Nourse (1976) identified the ideal building code 
standard as one that improved quality to a level where 
additional costs of quality improvement are exactly equal 
to additional benefits accruing to society. These levels 
would be difficult to identify since the additional gains 
in benefits to the community wou1.d be difficult to identify 
and express in monetary units. The c~des apparently do 
have a positive effect in that they improve the quality of 
housing. Nourse believed that building codes go beyond 
preventing epidemics and fires. However, subsidizing the 
poor in standard quality housing with the reasoning that 
surrounding property values will be improved does not have 
sufficient evidence. Furthermore, building codes appear to 
go beyond preventing epidemics and fire dangers. They also 
increase housing costs. 
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The National Commission on Urban Problems (1968) 
conducted a review of the allegations that the plethora of 
building codes add to housing costs, delay construction, 
inhibit creative design, have provisions which are 
outdated, and are dominated by a very small group in the 
industry, among other problems. Upon conducting a survey 
(as well as a program of hearings, meetings, interviews, 
etc.) involving approximately 18,000 units of local 
government, the Commission found that the allegations were 
true and that major technical and political change was 
needed. 
To maintain restrictive codes, a subsidy would be 
required to enable poorer households to afford some minimum 
standard of living. This concept is directly related to 
the "merit good" aspects of housing introduced in the 
beginning of this chapter. 
Rothenberg (1976) basically followed Nourse's 
argument. He used the inverse to illustrate positive 
externalities, i.e., his argument discussed the negative 
effects resulting from poor or inadequate housing. The 
areas discussed by Rothenberg were basically those 
discussed above: fire h3zards, illness, crime, and 
psychological and social adjustment problems. The 
conclusions drawn from the studies imply that empirical 
evidence is difficult to achieve, but the hypothesis that 
positive external spillovers occur from good housing was 
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not rejected. An implication of the findings is that low-
income slum residents be the focus of housing intervention. 
Additionally, views of housing should encompass structure, 
neighborhood, and accessibility. 
Two interesting problems regarding external effects 
were identified by Grebler and Burns (1977) regarding the 
incidence of benefits from improved housing. The first 
issue is the temporal distribution, i.e., benefit streams 
are likely to change over time with the possibility of 
zero benefits or even disbenefits appearing in the short 
run followed by benefits.* Disruptions following a move 
were not unexpected until adjustments to new environments 
occurred (Schorr, 1966). The temporal distribution of the 
benefit stream due to improved housing was not explicitly 
addressed in the cited literature. It may be that its 
identification and incorporation into the 
assessment/evaluation studies would clarify the 
inconclusive evidence. 
The second issue is the sectoral distribution of the 
benefits accruing from housing investments. By this it is 
meant that health effects from the housing sector may spill 
over into the health care sector, education benefits into 
the education sector, etc. If this spillover effect is 
unaccounted for, the receiving sector(s)--such as above, 
*The time factor identifying the short run was not 
identified. 
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education and health--will experience efficiency increases 
as output increases, but the credit will be undeserved, 
i.e., education and health will receive output increases 
due to housing. The relevance of this issue becomes 
apparent when the rule for optimum resource allocation is 
reviewed. It occurs where, " ••• the marginal contribution 
of housing investment to national income just equals the 
decrease in the alternative sectors resulting from an 
additional investment in housing." (Grebler and Burns, 
1977, p. 163) The implication is that unaccountability for 
the spillover will probably lead to underinvestment in the 
housing sector. From a policy standpoint, it would be 
difficult to disentangle the spillovers occurring among the 
different sectors which compete for investment within a 
national economy. 
An additional rationale linked to the concept of 
external effects involves an economic-behavioral model of 
dccisionmaking under uncertainty. Davis and Whinston 
(1966) introduced the idea that if two neighbors are in an 
area undergoing deterioration, uncertainty will tend to 
produce a situation known as the "prisoner's dilemma" where 
rational behavior by individuals will imply a housing 
investment level incongruent with the socially optimal 
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one.* For example, two homeowners have the choice to both 
upgrade their dwellings, which would result in a 10 percent 
return for each. If only one of them upgrades while the 
other does not, his realized return becomes four percent, 
which represents a negative external effect of an 
unimproved neighbor's house. The second neighbor however, 
gains six percent due to the upgrading, assuming that the 
second neighbor can gain five percent from investing funds 
elsewhere. (See Table II.) 
Uncertainty and self interest would imply a decline in 
neighborhood quality given no cooperation between the 
homeowners, because the individually rational reaction for 
each is not to invest, since that would yield the highest 
outcome. However, Mills, (1979) views the condition as 
too restrictive. There would be no dilemma if neighbors 
communicated, because they would obviously both choose 
upgrading. 
The "neighborhood effect" could thus be minimized by 
agreements between property owners regarding property 
maintenance through private covenants p e.g., Planned Unit 
Development (PUD) bylaws, etc. It should be noted, 
however, that the external effects do exist and that 
transaction costs in making agreements can be high enough 
*The model is where two crime suspects are 
interrogated separately by the D.A. If both confess, both 
go to jail. If neither confesses, both go free. If one 
incriminates the other, (s)he is rewarded. Given the 
unknown nature of the other's strategy, each will be better 
off by confessing; both will confess and go to jail! 
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to make the dilemma applicable. Even so, go¥ernment 
involvement with housing would not be justified to warrant 
public housing, but rather with measures to reduce housing 
investment uncertainties and enforce contractual 
obligations. 
Other external effects include blockbusting and 
abandonment. Bourne (1981) identified the blockbusting 
practice as a means of securing rights to an area at the 
lowest possible cost. The process typically involves the 
purchase of several houses in the areas which are ripe for 
development and then renting those units to a clientele 
perceived by the neighborhood to lower the value of the 
whole area. The new clientele may be perceived, for 
example, as the "wrong" class or color. This process would 
lead to flight from the neighborhood and declining land 
prices, but speculative gains for some owners. 
Abandonment refers to housing that has been given up--
both legally and actually (Meeks, 1980, p. 86). It can 
occur even in tight housing markets. Grigsby and Rosenberg 
(1975) emphasized the following causes of abandonment. 
(1) Increases in operating costs; 
(2) absentee landlords unwilling and/or unable to 
maintain the properties; 
(3) poor management; and/or 
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(4) racial or socioeconomic changes which increase 
uncertainty. 
Vandalism could be listed, but is usuallY thought of 
as a symptom rather than a cause of abandonment. 
Additionally, the above causes appear to have an 
interactive effect to induce the abandonment process. 
TABLE II 
ILLUSTRATION OF THE PRISONER'S DILEtH1A 
Options*** Gains: I II 
A. Both invest 10% 10% 
B. I Invests, II does not +4 6* + 5** 
C. II invests, I does not +6* +5** 4 
D. Both do not invest 5 5 
Hany or the external effects mentioned above would 
warrant corrective regulatory approaches such as 
antidiscrimination and fair housing laws, land use 
regulations, etc. 
Finally, there is an external issue which is seldom 
addressed in the housing literature, and that is the 
*From external effects 
**From investing elsewhere 
***In the context of the prisoner's dilemma, Option A 
corresponds to both prisonPfs not confessing. Options Band 
C, one confesses the other does not; and in D both prisoners 
confess. 
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political effect. From a political perspective, housing 
may be more attractive than other social programs because 
of its high visibility factor, i.e. housing projects such 
as public housing are more obvious than food or health 
programs. There is an additional argument that housing by 
the public sector, especially where home ownership is 
involved, will stabilize a prevailing socioeconomic system. 
Spatial Effects 
Two considerations of spatial aspects are the regional 
extent and distribution of housing within the national 
context and the locational distribution within urban areas. 
Regarding the former, quality housing may be viewed as an 
influence on migration patterns, which is an important 
instrument in effectuating "growth center strategies." 
These strategies represent efforts to promote the 
development of lagging regions within the national economy. 
This can be achieved through investment policies that would 
enable a region to reap scale and agglomeration effects as 
well as investments in social overhead (housing, education, 
health, etc.) to make the lagging area attractive for 
migrants (Hansen, 1975). There are views, however, that 
emphasize housing as being a condition rather than a 
determinant of migration. Grebler and Burns (1977) cited 
empirical evidence that housing is a weak migration 
stimulus. A study funded by the World Bank in 1974 
reviewed eighty-nine migration studies in developed and 
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developing countries and concluded that the most powerful 
migration determinants were economic, i.e., the expected 
net returns of the migratory move were more influential 
than housing quality. 
A second spatial consideration involves locational 
decisions within urban areas. In the United States, the 
core-periphery dilemma involving income/race segregation 
has brought up the issue of, "opening up the suburbs," or 
racial and socioeconomic integration. Heilbrun (1981) 
reviewed several poliCies that were designed to encourage 
racial and economic dispersion. 
The policies were classified as "permissive" or 
"active." The former refers to actions that aim at 
removing discriminatory practices, including exclusionary 
zoning, but do not directly subsidize housing, e.g. the 
Civil Rights Act of 1968, which outlawed discrimination in 
housing. 
directly 
"Active" policies, on the other hand, would 
lower housing costs for the poor. One approach 
involves establishing a state or national housing authority 
with the power to build or lease housing for the low 
income clientele. This housing authority would utilize 
national or state criteria for planning and locating 
housing so as to o~erride possible local resistance to 
integration. 
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Macroeconomic Effects 
The rationale espousing the stimulation of the economy 
by utilizing 
instruments as 
housing investments as countercyclical 
well as job and income generators is a 
controversial one. 
Macroeconomic stimulation was an issue rooted in the 
history of the U.S. involvement with housing. The earliest 
federal housing programs were started during the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. The Public Work& Administration 
was authorized to construct or finance public works 
including public housing. At the forefront of housing 
programs was the promotion of economic recovery by creating 
additional employment. This notion was so important that 
in 1935 the housing program funds were cut in half when it 
was decided that alternative public works provided more 
jobs in a shorter time (Weicher, 1980). The earlier 
efforts were thus more oriented toward the production 
rather than the consumption of housing. There are schools 
of thought that believe that the thrust of housing policy 
in the U.S. is still oriented toward that end. Marcuse 
(1979) expresses this production over consumption 
predominance in a rather sharp criticism of the concept of 
a, Ilbenevolent housing policy," Le. one geared toward the 
solution of social problems of housing. His view i~ that 
benevolent housing policy is a false concept based on an 
analysis of public housing programs. 
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A conceptual basis of housing investments may be 
viewed as the additional benefits to the economy, e.g. 
Solomon (1974) defines the housing employment benefits as 
the value added in earnings over and above what these 
earnings would have been without the housing investment 
decision. In evaluating housing effects on the economy, 
Varaday (1982) claims that the reasoning based on housing 
subsidies being a stimulus to the economy is spurious 
because other federal programs work toward that 
macroeconomic goal also, and if compared, they too would 
provide the stimulus. This view, however, was not backed 
by any empirical evidence. 
A problem exists in identifying the benefits of 
housing investments on the economy. As far as federal (or 
central) government efforts are concerned, regional and 
local economies will be likely to reLpond differently to 
national changes in the business cyc1es.* For example, 
Vaughan (1980) examined the U.S. labor markets cyclical 
behavior by region from 1960 to 1970 and found that there 
were large variations among metropolitan areas in 
employment cycles in response to national trends because of 
their larger, more diverse economic structures which 
reflected the nation more so than smaller areas. 
Responses were measured by conformity to national trends as 
*Business cycles 
secular growth rate 
thereof. 
can be broadly 
of the economy 
defined as the 
and fluctuations 
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well as market responsiveness and the extent of lead or lag 
times. Regional variations in economic structure thus 
complicate the evaluation of housing policies in terms of 
their macroeconomic stimulative effects,e.g. if a given 
region has low unemployment or has a building material 
constraint that is not typical of the national scene, 
efforts to stimulate the econolliY through housing (or other 
public works type programs) will cause inflation until the 
regional bottlenecks are cleared. 
On the national level, Weicher (1980), points out that 
due to the inverse relationship of housing construction 
activity to interest rate levels, government investment in 
housing may allow production expansion easily when interest 
rates are low, when other industries are declining and 
releasing idle resources, i.e., during recessionary times. 
The ex post facto record, according to Weicher, has Yielded 
a different finding. Several examples were cited (Weicher, 
1980, p. 9): 
(1) The Section 221(d)(3) program--which basically 
subsidized interest rates on mortgages for 
privately owned apartments, was initiated in 1961 
to aid the housing market, which was in a 
recession. Overall housing production reached 
"impressive" levels (350,000 units from 1960 to 
1963) before the program reached its maximum 
10,000 units per year in 1964, 
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(2) Similarly, Section 8 new construction--where the 
federal government subsidized private developers 
and state housing agencies by guaranteeing a 
certain minimum rent above that which would be 
paid by the low income residents--was enacted in 
1974, which was a recessionary year for housing. 
The housing industry recovery took place before 
the program's achieving its peak of 125,000 units 
in 1977. 
(3) Public housing has had little demonstrated effect 
on overall housing production since its 
inception, according to a 1978 Congressional 
Budget Office review. It was also noted that 
there were long lead times required for site 
acquisition and construction. 
(4) Subsidized housiug prod~ction appeared to have 
substituted for unsubsidized production that 
would have taken place anyway. Specific programs 
were cited including Section 221 (d)(3), Section 
235 and 236, all of which were interest rate 
subsidy programs. It was also claimed that 
private construction levels were actually 
dampened by the additional vacancy rates caused 
by public housing. 
(5) Encouraging production for the non-poor appeared 
to generate a greater macroeconomic stimulus than 
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income tested programs. Hendershott and Villani 
(1977) found that government mortgage assistance 
affected housing starts initially, but its 
effects faded over the business cycle* 
Weicher concluded that the evidence is weak in making 
a case for federal housing policy's achievement of broad 
economic goals. 
Grebler and Burns (1977) conducted a more thorough 
analysis of the macroeconomic effects of housing 
investment. In addressing employment effects, the 
assertion was that housing would be a good employment 
generator because of the relatively large proportion of 
unskilled workers required, as well as the relative ease of 
entry into the industry. This issue tries to make a case 
for the housing industry being a point of entry to the 
urban labor market, especially for recent migrants. It is 
justified to the extent that net increases in product 
result over other possible employment possibilities. 
The extent of forward and backward linkages also 
determines the effectiveness of housing policy on the 
macroeconomy. Forward linkag~s are those linking housing 
to consumer-oriented industries such as furniture, 
carpeting, etc., whereas backward linkages are those 
*This finding was cited in a study of the "Tandem 
Plan," which involved interest rate subsidies to lenders 
who were to pass the reduced rates to builders and home 
buyers. 
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linking the industry to raw material industries, such as 
concrete, lumber, etc. Empirical evidence for Mexico 
indicated that construction was one of the higher 
employment generators, with low cost multi-dwellings being 
the highest. This evidence was supported by employment 
figures for Venezuela and Columbia (Grebler and Burns, 
1977, p. 196). 
Employment effects naturally lead to income effects, a 
function of the multipliers for a given country or region. 
In a World Bank study, income multipliers for Columbia, 
Korea, Mexico, and Pakistan were found to converge on a 
value of two. Thus, for every dollar spent on 
construction, a net effect of two dollars was generated 
throughout the economy (Greb1er and Burns, 1977, p. 196).* 
The effect of housing on savings was also addressed. 
Home purchase or renovation was viewed as a powerful 
stimulus to savings, which would be a favorable condition 
toward improving capital shortages, especially in poorer, 
less developed economies. To the extent that saving 
occurs, reduction in current consumption results and that 
has a dampening effect on possible increases in consumer 
spending. This latter effect, regarding the l~tel of 
prices, has been viewed as being subject to the source of 
financing leading to an increase in demand for housing as 
*These multipliers should be interpreted with caution 
since it was not clear how they were derived. 
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well as the strength of linkages between the final demand 
sector and the intermediate supply sectors. If the 
increase in demand for housing is financed internally or 
domestically, decreases in the demand for other non-
housing goods should occur or else pressure would be 
put on prices. If the increase in demand is externally 
financed, e.g. through foreign aid, proportional reductions 
in non-housing goods and services need not necessarily take 
place in order to insure price stability. Using data for 
Mexico and Korea, Grebler and Burns (1977) analyzed price 
effects due to increases in construction output and found 
that the expected price effects of two ambitious housing 
programs in those countries were minimal--around 1.5 
percent for Korea and less than 1 percent for Mexico. 
Finally, the effects of the housing sector on the 
balance of payments is expected to be small, but it is 
difficult to generalize. Some of the derived demands due 
to housing, e.g. for carpeting, may require an increase in 
imports and thus a worsening of the balance of payments. 
On the other hand, to the extent that housing may replace 
activities in other sectors which had higher import 
requirements, an improvement in the balance of payments 
should occur. Broad generalizations regarding balance of 
payments effects stress the relatively low dependence of 
the housing sector on imports due to the comparative ease 
of substitution of indigenous products for foreign ones as 
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well as the weight and bulk of building materials which, 
when coupled with the geographic dispersion of the housing 
sector activity, make imports less competitive. 
The above discussion of the macroeconomic rationale 
for housing investment provides a mixed view. On the one 
hand, there are definite positive effects on the economy to 
be expected from housing programs; but on the other hand it 
does not appear that these effects by themselves would 
justify a housing investment scheme in lieu of other 
sectoral investments. Furthermore, the exact effects would 
be difficult to predict and generalize before the fact. 
Efficiency 
A final rationale justifying housing support is that 
inefficiencies do exist in capital markets and in the 
construction activity itself. Regarding the former, it is 
obvious that housing takes a substantiel portion of a 
household's budget, especially for home ownership and where 
there are no financing facilities to handle mortgages. One 
of the very important roles by which governments have aided 
the housing market is through finance, i.e., to close the 
gap between the timing of given income streams and the 
prevailing shelter costs. The importance of this issue is 
illustrateJ in the fact that the formation of the Federal 
Home Loan Bank System in 1932 and the Federal Housing 
Administration in 1934 in the U.S. were viewed as being 
successful in promoting home ownership in the U.S. Home 
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ownership increased from 44 percent in 1940 to 65 percent 
in 1976 (Weicher, 1979).* 
Regarding the construction sector itself, it was 
claimeo that building houses takes time so that the supply 
of housing cannot be increased sufficiently to deal with 
the increasing demands for shelter. Montgomery and 
Mendelker (1979, p. 49) state for example that, "since 
housing is so complicated, fixed in space, and necessarily 
expensive, changes in supply occur slowly or not at all." 
Rather than accepting the above simplistic view at face 
value, review of the literature reveals different housing 
supply expectations. 
First, the concept of housing supply elasticity shall 
be defined as a measure of the percentage change in 
quantity for a given one percentage change in price. It is 
a measure of the responsiveness of housing. 
Secondly, the short versus long run shall be 
identified within a resource context. For example, having 
at least one fixed resource would imply the short run, 
whereas the long run implies no fixed resources. 
In response to a demand increase for housing, the 
following supply responses were identified as 
*FHLB is a financial system designed to provide 
liquidity for mortgage holding institutions. FHA was 
designed to insure housing loans so as to stabilize and 
facilitate sound home financing. 
possibilities (Rydell, 1980):* 
(1) an increase in the repair of substandard housing; 
(2) an increase in the occupancy rate; 
(3) an increase in new construction. 
The first two responses typically characterize short 
term responses to a demand increase for housing. The last 
listed response is likely to make greater demands upon 
building resources and to take a longer time to adjust. 
Additionally, Olsen (1976) claims that there are houses in 
the building stage whose completion can be speeded up in 
response to a short run price increase. Olson also claims 
that a change in demand may be due to a change in the 
number of households and/or a change in the demand for 
housing quality (as in (1) above). The implication of this 
distinction is that quality changes (upgrading, painting, 
refurnishing, etc) to existing housing are not necessarily 
slow and thus the view that housing is "typically" slow is 
not necessarily correct. 
In support of this view, Rydell (1979) studied the short 
run response of housing to rent increases.** According to 
Rydell, the occupied supply curve should be elastic until 
*These responses were neither mutually exclusive nor 
collectively exhaustive. 
**Ernpirical results were based upon data from the 
Housing Allowance Supply Experiment, which was restricted 
to rental housing. 
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the vacancy rate approaches zero, i.e., the vacancy rate 
may be viewed as the "fulcrum" upon which supply and demand 
equilibriate, the case here being similar to frictional 
unemployment in labor markets. When the occupancy rate is 
close to 100 percent, rents and house values would rise, 
leading to an adjustment via construction or filtering 
(both of which are long-run adjustments). 
Muth (1960) investigated the supply of urban housing 
by observing the behavior of factor inputs (material and 
labor prices) and the rate of entry of firms into the home 
building industry. The data examined was for the U.S. and 
it led Muth to conclude that the supply of new housing was 
elastic in the long run. One of the limitations of the 
Muth study is that by addressing new housing only, the 
majority of the housing stock, i.e., the existing stock, 
was not included. DeLeeuw and Ekanem (1971) focused their 
study on the long run elasticity of supply of housing 
services. Housing services was to denote a quantity of 
services yielded by a unit of housing stock per unit of 
time. Data of 38 metropolitan areas in the U.S. were 
analyzed and results indicated that the long-run supply was 
generally low and when segmented into low, medium, and high 
rents. Elasticities were correspondingly lower for the low 
rent segments. 
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Ozanne and Struyk (1977) performed an empirical 
analysis of the supply elasticity in the Boston 
Metropolitan area over a ten-year period (1960-1970) for 
both rental and owner occupied units. Their findings were 
that the supply wa~ inelastic. This, however, was 
criticized on the grounds that the analysis excluded most 
of the ways that markets would respond over time to price 
changes (Rydell, 1980). Additional criticisms by Quigley 
(1979) and Grieson(1973) addressed design and 
methodological errors in the Ozanne/Struyk and 
Ekanem/DeLeeuw low estimates. 
An extremely important issue arising out of the above 
discussion is that even if the housing market is not very 
reponsive, this condition does not necessarily warrant 
public involvement in the form of constructing housing 
units. It would appear that a reasonable approach would 
involve identifying the causal elements that led to the 
supply inelasticity, e.g. if the inelasticity is caused by 
shortage of entrepreneurial skills or a general inability 
of the private sector to respond to the need for more 
housing as expressed in rising prices, then government 
involvement would appear to be warranted. If, on the 
other hand, bottlenecks facing the construction sector are 
due to government action itself, e.g. a land use policy 
which unnecessarily restricts growth, then government 
involvement would fall more into the realm of a "self 
43 
fulfilling prophecy." A central issue here becomes the 
extent of the shortfall in the competence and/or ability of 
the private sector to achieve a given nation's qualitative 
and quantitative housing goals. 
The supply responsiveness issues may be better 
addressed in a normative framework which will be elaborated 
upon later. 
Housing Policy Strategies 
In very general terms, there are two types of policies 
by which governments can effect the quality and quantity 0: 
housing. The first group mny be termed demand support 
policies and they refer to actions that influence the 
consu~ptiort aspects of hcus~ng. The second group are 
supply support policies and they refer to actions that 
influence the production of housing. 
~1usgrave (1976 ) set up the following typology 
regarding strategies and instruments for low income housing 
support. 
Fi~ h Strategies of Housing Support 
Source: Musgrave (1976, p. 225) 
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Demand Support 
These are subsidies given to the tenant or owner-occupant. 
General Income Maintenance. These involve direct payments 
with no strings attached, but suffers from two main 
features. First, a pnrtion of the transfer may be spent on 
non-housing goods,* which is a drawback when merit good 
aspects are considered~ Second, to close a housing 
poverty gap (the amount of money needed to elevate 
households out of poverty) to a given defined poverty line 
would imply a difficult choice. That choice will be in 
either imposing very high implicit marginal tax rates on 
those just above the poverty line or providing subsidies to 
households well above the poverty line, i.e., the technical 
structure of income maintenance programs in general has 
three components (Heilbrun, 1981, p. 313): 
Y = a guaranteed minimum income 
T = a take-back rate which reduces benefits for every 
dollar earned 
B == break-even level at which earned income is high 
enough that payments stop. 
Y 
The relationship between the elements is B == r. 
As an illustration of the claim made above, let Y = 20,000 
riyals** per year and T = 0.30 (a 30 percent take-back 
*Determined by the income elasticity of demand for 
housing, i.e., the percentage increase in housing 
expenditure for a 1 percent increase income. 
**One Saudi Arabian riyal == $0.30. 
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rate). This implies that assistance by the government will 
stop at B = 20,000= 67,000 riyals per year level. 
0.3 
Notice 
that to lower B, T will have to be set at a higher level, 
i.e., a higher margiilal tax rate. y may ~lsc be lowered, 
which impacts the needy. 
Two relevant issues to be gained from the above are 
that a choice has to be made between imposing a very high 
marginal tax rate for those just above the cut-off income 
or extending income benefits to those well above the 
minimum income (in the example above, to those with annual 
income~ of 67,000 riyals or $19,700). The second issue of 
concern here is that to the extent that expenditure 
leakages into other items such as food and health care 
occur, the effectiveness of this support will be inhibited. 
One of the greatest disadvantages with general income 
maintenance is that it does not address "merit" aspects of 
housing consumption discussed earlier. 
Earmarked Grants 
These are justified where meritorious characteristics 
of housing consumption are concerned, as mentioned earlier. 
A special case of demand support are housing allowances 
which are basically payments made directly to low income 
eligible households to help them pay the costs of living in 
housing of their choice as long as it meets certain minimal 
standards. Demand support subsidies have been fairly 
common in the U.S., e.g., the Section 23 leased (existing) 
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housing program where government leased modest standard 
housing at market prices and subleased the units to 
eligible households. The rent supplement program also 
provided income related subsidies to tenants of privately 
owned units (Allen, et aI, 1981) and also the Section 8 
"Existing" which acted as an income transfer for tenants 
subsidized in place (Weicher., 1980). 
In general terms, the arguments for demand support 
policies include the following: 
(1) They are more equitable in that they provide 
recipients with units comparable to those 
households just above the income limits for 
low income recipients. 
Criticisms 
(2) They are usually less expensive than new 
construction type supply policies. 
(3) They have the potential of being more 
accessible to a greater number of people. 
(4) They do not suffer from spatial 
(5) 
of 
concentration problems typical of supply-
type subsidies. 
Demand support policies that utilize the 
eXisting stock would encourage more 
maintenance and thus help preserve the 
investment sunk in the housing stock 
(Carlson and Heinberg, 1978, pp. 49-51). 
demand support policies include: 
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(1) They have a tendency to inflate housing 
prices, especially where time lags or 
housing supply inelasticity exists. 
(2) They transfer wealth inequitably from the 
lower income households to their landlords 
if the above condition applies. 
(3) Because demand support policies are usually 
not large enough to induce recipients to 
acquire new units, it was concluded by some 
that the supply of new units that are 
acceptable would not increase (Allen, Fitts, 
and Glatt, 1981). 
A final note regarding demand support policies is that 
they have represented the major part of the federal housing 
policy in the U.S. for middle and upper income households. 
This policy manifested itself in the form of itemized tax 
deductions for homeowners which worked out to an average of 
a 15 percent reduction in the price of owner-occupied 
housing (Quigley, 1980). Additionally, the imputed rent 
income derived from home ownership was not taxed. By 
contrast, the thrust of federal housing policy for low 
income households has been supply support oriented up until 
1974, when several demand support policies were enacted. 
Supply Support 
As the name implies, these policies are directed at 
the supply side (or suppliers) of the housing market. 
48 
Minimum Standards. In general terms, a policy which sets 
and effectively enforces minimum standards will reduce the 
supply of housing available to low income families 
(Musgrave, 1970, p. 226). Standards naturally may serve a 
vital role in protecting tenants against inadequate rental 
contracts, as well as playing a vital role in assuring 
public safety. The drawbacks of minimum standards have 
been mentioned earlier in this chapter. They include 
higher costs and delays in the construction process. These 
drawbacks must be more than balanced by the public health 
and safety promotion effects. 
Filtering. 
strategies, 
" ••• involving 
Downs (1969, p. 649) sketched several housing 
among which filtering was described as, 
strict enforcement of high or moderate 
quality standards for all new construction ••• and public 
subsidies focused primarily on middle or upper income 
households. Poor households receive units through 
filtering down of older units from higher income 
households." It should be noted here that filtering is a 
supply support subsidy from the viewpoint of the low income 
groups. It may be a demand subsidy for the higher income 
groups, i.e. the middle and upper income households would 
view filtering strategies as housing consumption stimuli. 
Public housing. Public housing stands today as the oldest 
and largest housing program in the U.S. (Weicher, 1980). 
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It has the following drawbacks: 
(1) High construction costs: In the U.S., this 
has been primarily attributed to the Davis-
Bacon Act of 1931, which required federal 
construction projects to pay the prevailing 
wage scale in the local area to all workers 
in public housing projects. 
(2) High land costs: In the U.S., it was the 
traditional practice to build housing 
projects on fairly exp~nsive land in large 
cities due to the fact that public housing 
was tied to slum clearance as a joint effort 
to improve housing conditions. 
(3) Operational problems: Primarily management 
problems have been cited, especially 
regarding responsiveness to repair and 
maintenance. 
(4) The lottery feature: Muth (1970) emphasized 
the point that public housing projects can 
only be enjoyed by a few of the applicants, 
thus the analogy to a "lottery," i.e. 
extensive screening has to be performed in 
order to accept dwellers and waiting lists 
tend to be longer than vacancy rates. 
The above does not imply that public housing is 
doomed. Several examples exist of well-built, reasonable 
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cost, well-managed public housing programs, such as in 
Singapore, where almost seventy percent of the population 
resides in public housing projects--both rented and owned. 
(Singapore Housing Development Board, 1982). 
This example of public housing successes may be the 
exception rather than the rule. Linn (1983) specifically 
mentions the Singapore public housing experience as an 
exception to the generally poor record of public housing in 
d~veloping countries. Success in the case of Singapore was 
attributed to several factors, which included affordable 
standards in design, cultural and social acceptability of 
the units, the availability of a large enough fiscal base 
to support the programs, and sufficient management and 
technical resources, as well as powerful local governments 
to implement the projects. 
Rent Control 
This is perhaps one of the most controversial policy 
instruments. In a strict sense it may be viewed as being a 
tactic rather than a strategy, i.e., it has a short-term 
reactionary focus rather than a long-term planning one. 
Meeks (1980) cites an empirical study in the Washington, 
D.C. area which concluded that controls will dampen 
investment in new housing. However, it was also found that 
occupants of rent controlled units were poorer and that if 
removed, major rent increases occur for lower income 
households (Meeks, 1980, p. 1983). The difficulty 
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in deciding to implement a rent control should weigh the 
concerns of weighing low income households' availability 
and cost issues in the short run versus private sector 
investments in housing in the long run. An "ideal" rent 
control would balance those concerns so as to minimize the 
potential conflict between social equity and economic 
efficiency. 
Toward An Applicable Theory 
The literature review thus far has utilized theories 
and empirical works that are predominantly American. A 
housing investment theory to guide and evaluate the Saudi 
Arabian housing policy will be required to be applicable to 
the country. The question may first be asked as follows: 
Is there a universal theory of housing investment? 
Universal Applicability 
Attempts to explain housing investment and consumption 
variations between countries were attempted by Greb1er and 
Burns (1977) and Strassman (1970). Considering the 
economic determinants capital was to be invested in housing 
as long as the expected marginal return exceeded the 
expected returns in other non-housing sectors. At lower 
development levels (defined in terms of Gross Domestic 
Product per capita) residential construction returns were 
exceeded by other activities. Data for thirty-nine 
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countries over 1963-1970 were analyzed by Grebler and Burns 
(1977), who found that poorer countries allocated lower 
shares of resources to housing. This was quantitatively 
expressed as the ratio of new residential construction to 
Gross Domestic Product. At an intermediate stage of 
development, greater shares were devoted to housing, and 
beyond that stagealternative non-housing investments outbid 
housing--and the richest countries again allocated lower 
shares to housing. An historical trend analysis for the 
United States revealed the same basic trend, i.e., by 
analyzing the ratio of residential construction to GNP from 
1891 to 1970 it was found that the ratio was declining. It 
was stated by Grebler and Burns that the beginning of the 
time period considered, whicii was the late nineteenth and 
early part of the twentieth century, was the mid-range of 
economic development. The reasoning explaining the decline 
in the "theory" describing housing share in a given 
development stage was expressed as being due to two 
elements: first, as a nation progresses past some middle 
development level, non-housing goods and services start 
competing for consumer and investor's dollars. Secondly, 
the additional demand for housing can be accommodated by 
investing in the established existing stock in addition to 
new buildings. 
The conclusion from the above was that the "share of 
housing in the total product of advanced countries is no 
sure guide to the relationship 'proper' for 
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all 
countries ••• "(Grebler and Burns, 1977, p. 41). 
A universal theory of housing investment would be 
difficult to conceptualize, given some of the rationales 
reviewed earlier in this chapter. 
include: 
Examples of these 
(1) Equity: The equity rationale, 
connotation of a "fair distribution of 
with its 
adequate 
housing," and its merit good implications, is 
likely to be different between countries, given 
the different norms that exist. 
(2) Internal Benefits: The effect of improved 
housing on mental and physical health was found 
likely to be affected by social and 
psychological processes of reaction, 
adaptation, and accommodation. These were, in 
turn, likely to be influenced by cultural 
elements, which differ internationally, making 
general predictions difficult. 
(3) Macroeconomic Benefits: As mentioned earlier, 
regional variations in economic structure would 
tend to complicate evaluations of housing based 
stiwulation effects. National differences in 
economic structure also would likely have that 
effect. Additionally, international variations 
in the extent to which public sector housing 
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construction would displace private sector 
housing construction would further complicate the 
analysis. 
(4) Efficiency: This rationale is probably one where 
a few broad generalizations can be safely made 
for developing countries. Inefficiencies in 
capital markets almost always exist, not only 
because of capital'shortages, but also because of 
a general lack of expertise in that area (Abrams, 
1964). Inefficiencies in the construction sector 
itself were identified by Smith (1980, pp 173-
181) and include land where land based wealth is 
likely to be the main source of economic and 
political power, thus fuelling land speculation. 
Building materials were also likely to be a 
constraint because of inabilities of developing 
countries to become self sufficient in this 
resource to reduce reliance on imports. Even 
though labor is assumed to have an elastic supply 
due to the abundance of workers and the general 
absence of wage rigidities, higher skilled and 
professional workers may not be available in 
abundance. Specific problems may also be 
encountered in the supply of entrepreneurial 
talent for a given underdeveloped country, 
especially where economies of scale necessitate 
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large scale contractors, making entry into the 
industry difficult. 
It appears that a universal framework to guide housing 
investment is difficult given the lack of generality of the 
rationales as reviewed, i.e., what may be applicable in one 
country may not be applicable in another, especially where 
cultures vary. Even though this finding may appear rather 
obvious, it has very serious implications. 
Goal setting and strategy designs necessitate a 
culture-specific approach which involves the rationales 
stated earlier. Importing know-how from Western developed 
countries to design strategies for alleviating housing 
shortages may fall into the trap of specifying programs and 
even policies based upon developed countries' experiences. 
As far as strategies of hou~ing support are concerned, 
it is likely that the prevailing sociopolitical framework 
in a given country will be the main policy determinant over 
and above some "rational" sectoral benefit/cost approach. 
For exam~le, in centrally planned systems, the greater 
likelihood is towards supply support strategies. This is 
because the size and capability of the private construction 
sector is likely to be relatively small. Even if 
construction inefficiencies were caused by public sector 
activity (or inactivity), likely actions would aim at 
tackling those issues utilizing public sector actions. 
In market type economies, the greater emphasis will 
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likely be given to demand support policies where the market 
mechanism is utilized to reveal and satisfy housing demand. 
Summary and Discussion 
This chapter started out by reviewing the basis for 
housing policy. An explicit assumption was made that by 
delineating the rationale for housing policy, its 
evaluation and analysis could be better performed. Several 
rationales were discussed and the relevant literature was 
reviewed. 
intuitive 
It was found that some of the widely accepted 
reasoning justifying housing support was 
challenged or not evident in several empirical works. The 
research efforts, which were primarily focused on the 
United States tended to yield inconclusive results for the 
following basis of housing support: the effect of poor 
housing on mental aud physical health, external effects, 
spatial effects, macroeconomic stimulation, and efficiency. 
A general theory was viewed as being unlikely, given 
the intercultural vBriation between countries, however 
several issues were likely to be important in generally 
guiding housing policy: the normative framework in a given 
country would define equity in resource distribution and 
housing assistance. The framework will likely be a 
decisive factor in determining whether market 
"imperfections" should be solved by helping the private 
sector or, alternatively, by replacing its activities. 
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Another issue which is likely to guide housing policy 
is the extent of inefficiencies that exist, especially in 
developing economies in the areas of finance and building 
within the housing markets. The inefficiencies were 
identified as being common in less developed countries, but 
they were not confined to private sector activities, i.e., 
public sector inefficiencies also exist within the housing 
area. 
In analyzing and evaluating the Saudi housing policy, 
the rationales reviewed in the literature will be addressed 
and their applicability will be examined. 
CHAPTER III 
THE SAUDI ARABIAN POLICY SETTING 
Introduction 
This chapter provides an overview of the Saudi 
housing policy determinants. We will begin by constructing 
a normative framework and then move to a discussion of the 
national development environment and direction as expressed 
in the Five Year Development Plans and miscellaneous growth 
statistics. 
An exposition 0! the housing sector will be 
provided using Jeddah, the second largest city 
provided 
in the 
Kingdom, as a case study to illustrate demographic c~anges, 
housing types and conditions, and housing sector problems 
in general. These will form the basis for understanding 
the housing policy which will be discussed in the next 
chapter. 
Policy Determinants 
A Normative Framework 
The importance of delineating and understanding the 
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normative framework that exists in the Kingdom is explained 
by the fact that cultural norms typically identify equity. 
Equity in turn would explain a "just and fair distribution" 
of goods and services, including housing, as outlined in 
the previous chapter. 
The religion of Islam represents a basic element in 
the Saudi Arabian culture and government. The Qur'an is 
the Kingdom's constitution and Islamic law (Shariah) is 
basically the law. Saudi Arabia is viewed, and considers 
itself to be, the guardian of the two Grand Mosques in 
Mecca and Medina (AI Haramayn). Additionally, Islam was 
the cohesive force by which the Kingdom had united and was 
declared an independent country in 1932. 
The Islamic Welfare State 
A central function of the Islamic state has been 
described as ensuring the good life and welfare (a1 falah) 
and alleviating hardships. This was in turn realized 
where fulfillment of the basic needs in the life were 
satisfied, including adequate food 
housing (Zarqa, 1980; Chupra, 1980). 
expected to be involved in certain 
including the following (Saqr, 1980): 
and clothing, and 
The state would be 
basic functions, 
Realizing better utilization £i economic resources. An 
example of this function would include the historical basis 
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of land ownership, which was land productivity, i.e. land 
ownership was granted traditionally to those citizens who 
could, through their own work, make it productive. 
Establishing and Applying Standards. In traditional 
Islamic societies a system by which standards for goods and 
services were established and applied was called "al 
ihtisab." This system was a complete set of rules to 
regulate activities and standards of various trades, to 
prevent counterfeiting of products, and to set building 
standards. 
Even though building regulations have been 
established, a building code has not been put into 
effect thus far. 
Interfering 
.!E.. i'1at'k~ts !Q. Control Prices. When 
absolutely necessary, the State can intervene to regulate 
prices where exceptional conditions exists, such as wars or 
natural disasters. Practices or conditions leading to a 
reduction in supply that have unfavorable implications 
would justify government action to correct the situation. 
Included under this category were rent controls. 
Realizing Equitable Income and Wealth Distribution. 
This principle accepts the basic fact that different innate 
acquired capabilities, tastes, and willingness to produce 
do exist, which implies differences in wealth and income. 
These in turn are viewed as being conducive to production 
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because of the underlying incentives. However, 
concentration of wealth and tremendous income inequalities 
are not accepted in Islam. (Qutub, 1982, p. 92) 
To deal with the inequalities in income and wealth, 
two kinds of instruments were available in Islam. The 
first involves built-in instruments, which are indisputable 
and unchangeable, such as the Hal zakah" and spending for 
charity (or Awqaf), both of which will be discussed below. 
The second redistribution instrument is discretionary. 
It varies according to societal needs and the extent to 
which the built in instruments can reduce inequalities. 
These include taxes and limitations on real estate 
ownership. 
The concept of income and wealth distribution is 
generally covered under "social guarantees" in Islamic 
political economy. Two basic principles corresponding to 
the instruments mentioned above are, general equality--
which aims at guaranteeing basic needs for less privileged 
groups by individuals. A pivotal instrument under this 
principle is "Zakat," an undisputed cornerstone of Islam 
which is a fixed 2 a S percent tax on wealth (money balances, 
jewelry, etc.) and variable tax rates on income. (Saqr, 
1980, p. 65). Zakat revenues are collected by the State, 
which is responsible for redistributing income by transfer 
payments and in-kind assistance. (Siddiqi, 1980). 
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The second principle involves the right of citizens to 
public resources, i.e. the state here was viewed as being 
responsible for guaranteeing "adequate" living standards 
for the needy so that living standards should increase as 
public wealth increases. (AI Sadr, 1977, p. 632) As 
public resources increased, so should the living standards. 
Other sources to alleviate poverty include "Sadaqa," 
which represents a voluntary charitable contribution by 
individuals and finally, the "Waqf" or endowment which 
represents a charitable, usually non-movable contribution 
to the poor and/or disadvantaged. The "Arbitah" or 
endowment "Housing for the Poor" is an example of "Waqf." 
They are donations made by citizens to less fortunate 
households. It should also be noted here that endowments 
can be in the form of cash (which is controversial) as 
illustrated by Mandaville (1979). 
There are other functions of the Islamic State, but 
the four mentioned above are the most relevant for 
identifying the Islamic normative basis for purposes of 
housing support. 
The Development Environment 
At the time of the consolidation of the different 
regions by King Abdul Aziz AI-Saud, and the formation of 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia in 1926, the economic status of 
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the country was poor. The national income primarily 
consisted of fees collected from Moslem pilgrims to Mecca 
and Medina (the Islamic Holy places) as well as some trade 
(DeQuin, 1976; Nyrop. 1977). It was not until 1938 when the 
Arabian-American oil Company ARAMCO) struck oil and that 
country's wealth began to emerge. The wealth of the 
Kingdom was directly linked to the prevailing conditions of 
the world oil situation, which was unfortunately volatile, 
and experienced a decline in crude oil prices between 1950 
and 1970 (Nyrop, 1977, p. 252). In 1974 the price of OPEC 
oil increased by more than 100 percent to U.S. $11.25, 
which led to an enormous impact on government revenues. 
Estimates of the contribution of oil to total revenues in 
1970 were 
1982). All 
placed at 89.2 percent (Minist~y of Planning, 
the petroleum that was produced, as well as 
reserves, which are the largest in the free world by some 
estimates, are government owned. In 1970 estimates of 
crude oil reserves were placed at 167.5 billion barrels or 
one quarter of world reserves (Ministry of Planning, 1980.) 
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the increases in oil production 
and the consequent increases in revenues and expenditures 
for the Kingdom. 
The economy witnessed a tremendous growth in revenues 
and expenditures (which increased by forty- and thirty-fold 
respectively over the decade). To manage this growth in a 
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rational, effective manner, the Kingdom initiated a 
national planning effort to be conceptualized and produced 
by a specialized government body, the Ministry of Planning. 
This Ministry is responsible for preparing status reports 
on the national economy which act as a basis for 
formulating broad planning strategies. These strategies 
are transformed into workable recommendations and specific 
criteria with the help of the other ministries of concern. 
Final approval is granted only by the King. Follow up and 
monitoring is usually conducted by the Ministry of 
Planning. (Nyrop, 1982, pp. 238-9) Specific funding 
areas would be the responsibility of the Ministry of 
Finance and National Economy. The development plans of the 
Kingdom are summarized below (Ministry of Planning, 1976, 
1980): 
The First FivE-Year Development Plan (1970-75) 
The general strategy of this plan was to ensure 
continued growth in the economy, to extend and improve 
infrastructure, to improve government services, and to 
develop human resources through education and training. 
Achievements of the Plan included an increase in the 
Kingdom's share of oil 
nationalization measures. 
revenues without 
In addition to 
drastic 
this, 
international oil prices were set by producing countries 
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and not oil companies. On the domestic front, total budget 
allocations increased for physical infrastructure, 
education, social services. 
The Second Five-Year Plan (1975-8Ql 
The general strategy of this plan was to further 
develop the country's physical infrastructure, to develop 
the hydrocarbon resources and industries so as to maximize 
resource conservation and industrial use, and to develop a 
stronger private sector that could actively participate in 
the development of the couotry. 
Achievements included a growth in gross domestic 
product that averaged 8 percent annually and a 13.3 percent 
annual a/erage growth rate for the non-oil sector in real 
terms. An "adequate" infrastructure network was also 
developed during this period and in the later years of the 
Plan inflationary pressures--which had soared due to the 
increases in the budget--were reduced. Finally, real 
growth in 
approximately 
per capita Gross Domestic Product 
26.4 percent over the period 1975 to 
The Third Five-Year Development Plan (1980-1985) 
was 
1980. 
The general strategy of this plan emphasized selected, 
rather than general, growth areas in the economy. It also 
call~d for consolidation rather than expansion of the 
foreign labor force. In fact, the plan stressed the 
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replacement of foreign workers by Saudis to the maximum 
possible extent. 
Specific broad policy objectives were identified as 
follows: (Ministry of Planning, 1980, pp. 16-17) 
(1) To induce structural changes in the economy 
through diversification of the economic base 
as well as insuring maximum value added from 
crude oil production in petroleum related 
industries. Additionally, the role of 
physical infrastructure improvements is 
reduced relative to the previous plans. 
(2) To promote efficiency in both the 
government and private sectors 
manpower- related programs as 
administrative changes in 
through 
well as 
government 
organization and procedure. This objective 
also included ensuring adequate finances to 
effeciently utilize infrastructure and plant 
machinery. 
(3) To promote participation of citizens and 
Social Welfare for Saudi Arabians in 
Development including a regional public 
investment program to ensure development to 
the full potential. Additionally, public 
information programs and religious and 
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social guidance were given high priorities 
to ensure the public awareness of their role 
in development as well as ensuring religious 
and social guidance. 
Achievements of the Third Plan cannot be fully 
assessed thus far because there is over one year left 
before the plan time frame expires. However, it should be 
mentioned that the level of prices has been reduced, and 
the structural change in the economy appears to be 
progressing as evidenced by the development in the two new 
industrial cities of Yanbu and Jubail. 
Several important issues resulting from the plans and 
related to housing, should be noted. 
The national economy underwent a structural change 
over the period 1970-1980. The non-oil sector has 
experienced a gradual growth from 43.6 percent in 1970 to 
over 50 percent in 1979, with the trend expected to 
continue. (Ministry of Planning, 1982) 
Gross Domestic Investment underwent 
change over time with construction 
holding a significant role of 
a significant 
of buildings 
total assets. 
The development plan's manpower requirements were morn 
than could be satisfied by the indigenous work force in 
terms of sheer numbers and also in specialties. Steps were 
thus taken to accommodate a larger number of foreign 
workers at all levels while simultaneously expanding 
investments in local manpower through education 
training. 
The non-Saudi manpower growth rate 
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upon 
and 
was 
approximately 16.5 percent annually compared to the Saudi 
element growth of 2.4 percent per year in the period 
1975-80. (Ministry of Planning, 1980) 
The general cost of living increased at a fast rate but 
stabilized towards the end of the decade. 
The Housing Sector 
Demographic Changes 
In response to employment and general business 
opportunities, which were enhanced by the development plans, 
the urban areas experienced an inflow of migrants from the 
rural areas and from abroai. In 1970, approximately 36 
percent of the popul~tion resided in urban areas. In 1980, 
54 percent of the total population lived in urban areas 
with 41 percent living in metropolitan areas with a 
population of over 100,000 (Ministry of Planning, 1980). 
According to an estimate by the consulting firm, SCET, 
(1975). The urban population is likely to reach 84 percent 
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TABLE III 
COST OF LIVING CHANGES KINGDOMWIDE 1970-80 
Indexes (1970 = 100) 
Housing % Change General % Change 
1970 100 100 
1971 111.5 11.5 104.9 4.9 
1972 121.6 9.1 109.3 4.2 
1973 136.2 12.0 127.0 16.2 
1974 189.2 38.9 154.2 21.4 
1975 332.8 75.9 207.6 34.6 
1976 479.8 44.2 273.0 31.5 
1977 490.7 2.3 304.2 11.4 
1978 468.0 -4.6 338.4 11. 2 
1979 467.3 -0.2 344.4 1.8 
1980 475.6 1.8 355.4 3.2 
Average 21.11 16.51 
Source: Ministry of Planning, 1982 
of the total population by the year 1995 A.D.* The total 
population of the Kingdom was 7.012 million in 1974 by 
estimates of the 1394 A.H. (1974 A.D.) census. At that 
time there existed seven cities and towns with populations 
over 100,000 (Central Dept. of Statistics, 1981). 
*The urban population includes people living in towns 
with more than 5,000 inhabitants. 
TABLE IV 
GROSS DotmSTIC INVESTMENT AND GROSS DOHESTIC PRODUCT 
1970-80 
A. SECTORIAL SlLA..RES OF GROSS DOHESTIC INVESTXENT 
1969- 1970- 1971- 1972- 1973- 1974- 1975- 1976- 1977- 1978- 1979-
70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 73 79 80 
OIL 
SECTOR 11.7 21.2 19.2 36.6 28.5 19.3 15.3 14.1 10.8 10.7 10.2 
NON OIL 
GOVERN-
HENT 43.3 44.2 41.2 35.6 37.0 40.0 51.0 52.6 54.3 63.6 61.7 
NON OIL 
PRIVATE 37.6 42.2 36.9 29.9 25.5 36.2 31.0 31.8 24.6 25.2 23.2 
B. SHARE OF (BUILDINGS) CO~lSTRUCT10N Ul TOTAL ASSETS (%) 
31.0 33.0 29.7 30.3 22.1 37.3 39.9 35.9 34.5 41.1 34.8 
C. TOTAL GROSS DOHESTIC INVESTMENT (Nillions Riyals) 
2806 2580 3116 4394 6586 7386 9732 13399 16178 14385 17517 
D. GRm~TH RATE OF GRI)SS DO~1ESTIC HJVESTMENT 
-8.1 20.8 41.0 49.9 12.1 31.8 37.7 20.7 -11.1 21.8 23.9 
E. GROSS DOMESTIC PRODUCT A~D ITS ;: GROWTH R.'\TE RESPECTIVELY 
17399 19907 22963 27495 31642 31723 34461 39968 42028 44838 49127 
14.4 15.4 19.7 15.1 0.3 8.6 15.1 5.9 5.6 9.6 10.6 
Sources: Hinistry of Planning, 1982; Central Department of Statistics, 
1979-80 
NOTES: 
1. The dates indicated are approximate. The government utilizes Hijra 
dates for its fiscal years and a conversion was thus utilized. 
2. Percentages do not add to 100 due to errors and omissions in the 
official figures. 
3. Total assets mentioned in category B include other (non-building) 
construction, transportation equipment, miscellaneous machinery, etc. 
4. Gross Do~estic Product is expressed in retail prices. 
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As far as income distribution is concerned, national 
data are not accessible. However, data for the City of 
Jeddah was acquired and the following results obtained:* 
TABLE V 
INCOME DISTRIBUTION BY HOUSEHOLD, JEDDAH 
MONTHLY INCOME (RIYALS) 1971 percent 1978 percent 
Less Than 500 56.0 n.a. 
500 - 1000 26.3 4.9 
1000 - 2000 12.6 19.6 
2000 - 5000 4.0 45.8 
5000 and above 1.1 29.7 
Source: Sert-Jackson Socio Economic Survey 1398 A.H. (1978 
A.D.). 
Several points need to be clarified regarding the above: 
(1) The income figures have net been adjusted for 
price level changes over the ?eriod 1971-78. 
This does not make the distribution as good as it 
appears. 
(2) The figures represent the total Jeddah population 
*In conducting the Action Master Plans for the City of 
Jeddah, the consulting firm of Sert-Jackson International 
(U.K.) conducted a survey of the city in 1398 A.H. (1978 
A.D.). A 5 percent random sample of the total number of 
households was utilized, yielding n = 8675 households. The 
response rate was 86.9 percent. 
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included in the survey. Table VI for the year 
1978 breaks down the distribution by nationality 
indicating the higher level of income for the 
Saudi Arabian indigenous population as opposed to 
the temporary foreign labor. 
(3) The figures ~epresent disposable income since 
there exists no income or other personal taxes. 
(4) Basic services such as medical care and education 
were available free of charge and were more 
readily available in 1978, thus improving the 
income situation. 
The data in Table VI were based upon the 1978 
socioeconomic survey. Data for 1971 were based on the 
results of a social survey conducted in 1971. It is likely 
to be biased to the extent that Saudi Arabian families are 
likely to be nuclear or even extended families whereas many 
of the foreign workers, especially the non-skilled and 
semi-skilled did not have their families with them in the 
Kingdom. Additionally, there were economies of scale 
inherent in sharing dwelling units by several "one man" 
families that would tend to enhance the income figures for 
foreign workers. 
Finally, the overall population of Jeddah has 
experienced an average growth of 12.6 percent 
from 595,900 in 1974 to 915,800 in 1978, 
annually--
based upon 
estimates by Sert-Jackson, Ltd. (1980). 
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Jeddah's growth 
pattern is likely to be illustrative of the other major 
metropolitan areas, i.e. growth through foreign work force 
in migration as well as rural migration. 
Housing Types and Condition 
The following represents a brief overview of the 
dwelling types in the Kingdom (SCET, 1975): 
The Sandaga (Shanty). is a small (3 x 4 or 5 x 4 m) 
rectangular structure with walls made of boards of wood or 
aluminum from packing boxes. It is extremely cheap, and 
easy to construct--especially that its building material 
requirements are very low. It is usually built by 
transient populations who are considered to be 
"trespassers." 
Ara bic. Traditional. may be constructed by using 
mud bricks (Toob Lebin) for walls, and timber from palm 
trees for reofs. Sometimes it is also called "Beyt Lebin" 
(mud brick house) when constructed by mud bricks. It can 
be constructed by using more modern materials (reinforced 
concrete, timber, etc.). It is usually a detached house 
with separate facilities and entrances for men and women 
and has a courtyard so that space is internally utilized. 
Apartments. are generally found in buildings ranging 
in height from one to six stories,even though in later 
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years buildings containing over ten stories are not 
unusual. Usually these units include an entry, a reception 
room or salon, bedroom(s), bathroom(s), family/dining 
reoms. Up to the time of this writing, all apartments were 
rental type and there existed no ownership program of any 
sort, except for apartment building owners who lived in 
their own apartments. 
Villas. are usually larger than other dwelling types. 
Construction utilizes modern materials (reinforced 
concrete, cement, etc.) They are usually more roomy and 
include separate sections for men and women.* 
As part of the Jeddah Action Master Plan 
studies, a housing survey was conducted by Sert Jackson in 
1978. A street block survey technique was utilized where 
the predominant condition of the block was recorded. 
Tables VII through IX illustrate the distribution of 
dwellings by type, age, and condition in Jeddah. 
It should be noted that these findings are general in 
nature because a street block survey technique was utilized 
where the predominant condition of the block was recorded. 
*In the Saudi Arabian culture, separation of 
socializing areas by sex is traditional. Due to the larger 
floor areas, villas ~nd traditional housing would tend to 
accomodate that tradition more so than other housing types. 
TABLE VI 
110NTHLY FAMILY INCOME IN RIYALS BY NATIONALITY 
FOR THE CITY OF JEDDAH 
Nationality Under 1000 1000 - 1999 2000 - 4999 5000 - 9999 
Number % Number % Number % Number % 
Saudi Arabian 2668 3.8 12259 17.5 31004 39.7 14260 20.4 
Yemini 3151 10.4 :to695 15.4 11983 15.3 3128 10.3 
Palestinian 207 1.2 2024 13.1 10212 13.1 3496 20.9 
Egyptian 805 4.4 2622 14.5 9131 11.7 4761 26.3 
Others 1495 80.2 5635 20.5 15824 20.2 10764 22.1 
TOTAL 8329 4.8 33235 19.2 78154 45.0 36409 21.0 
Source: Sert Jackson, 1979 
Over 10,000 
Number % 
7935 ILl) 
667 2.2 
621 3.7 
782 4.3 
4209 79.4 
14214 8.2 
Total 
69874 
30245 
16767 
18124 
38479 
-.J 
<J' 
T~l2e of 
Sandaga 
TABLE VII 
DISTRIBUTION OF DWELLINGS BY TYPE 
IN JEDDAH, 1978 
Dwelling Number Percentage 
(Shanty) 5290 3.0 
Arabic Traditional 50968 29.4 
Villa 13409 7.7 
Apartments 93978 54.2 
Other 9844 5.7 
Source: Sert-Jackson, Ltd. , Socio Economic Survey 
Jackson, 1979, p. 114 ) 
TABLE VIII 
AGE OF DWELLINGS IN JEDDAH, 1978 
Age Sandaga Tradit. Villa Apt. 
No. % No. % No. % No. % 
5 yrsl 1311 24.8 11109 21.8 4991 38.8 26128 27.8 
or less 
6-19yrs 2852 53.9 30774 60.4 7498 58.2 59639 63.5 
20 yrsl 1127 21.3 9085 17.8 391 3.0 8211 8.7 
or more 
Source: Sert-Jackson, Ltd.,(1979, p. 121) 
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(Sert-
Total 
% 
26.0 
60.9 
13.1 
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TABLE IX 
CONDITION OF DWELLINGS IN JEDDAH, 1978 
Building TI:Ee Condition 
Villas 80% Good 
Apartments 70% Good, 25% Fair, 5% Bad 
Traditional 50% Fair, 30% Bad 
All Buildings 50% Good, 30% Fair, 20% Bad 
The ratings were based upon the following guidelines: 
Bad: Structural defects and/or partial collapse 
Fair: 
Good: 
Misalignment 
horizontal) 
of building (vertical or 
Non-permanent materials used in construction 
Lack of vehicular access 
Lack of 
(windows 
privacy due to ext~eme proximity 
within two meters of each other) 
Defects in non-structural materials of the 
building, including windows and doors 
None of the above defects. 
Source: Sert-Jackson, (1979, p. 199) 
Finally, the tenure status of housing in Jeddah changed 
substantially from 1971 to 1978 as indicated below. The 
Saudi Arabian government does not allow non-Saudis to own 
property. and the above figures apply to the whole city. 
Survey results indicate a 40 percent ownership rate for 
Saudi households in 1978, which is an improvement over 
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1971. However, approximately 50 percent of Saudi 
households rent their dwellings (Sert-Jackson, 1979). The 
main reason for this relatively high rate is the high cost 
of home ownership. This issue will be discussed later. 
TABLE X 
TENURE IN JEDDAH, 1971 VERSUS 1978 
Tenure 1971 
Own house 
Rent 
30.8% 
64.5% 
Other(company 4.7% 
compounds, rplative's 
homes, etc. 
1978 
18.6% 
76.9% 
4.5% 
Source: Sert-Jackson (1979, figure 6.13) 
The above results were for all nationalities. Ownership 
rates among Saudis were found to be approximately 40 
percent in 1978. 
Housing Sector Problems 
The five-year development plans, as reviewed earlier, 
led to an expansion in the economy for which many sectors 
in the economy were unprepared. The housing sector, which 
includes builders, real estate agents, financiers, and 
local government officials, was incapable of accomodating 
the increases in demand for housing in a very short time 
span. The increases in demand, as identified in earlier 
sections, were due to the following: 
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1. An increase in the urban population due to the 
in-migration of foreign workers as well as rural 
inhabitants who migrated toward the cities; 
2. An increase in income and wealth leading to an 
increase in the demand for quality dwellings. 
3. A general lack of investment portfolio 
instruments beyond real estate. This element was 
coupled with the tremendous returns on real 
estate that exceeded even foreign investment 
instruments. 
One of the main data problems in this category is that 
land ownership was not codified into a system which clearly 
defined property rights (according to findings by seET 
1975, pp II-I,ll). Local government municipalities were 
not able to effectively regulate land uses due to the 
existence of "unquestionable land use" situations, i.e. the 
use of land was up to its individual owner. Growing land 
speculation especially close to the urban center led to an 
increasing demand for the usually less expensive outlying 
areas. This effect was catalyzed by declining 
transportation cost (low gasoline prices and low import 
duties on automobiles). Provision of infrastructure beLame 
a prominent problem during the early and middle 1970s. 
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Infrastructure was viewed as the government's 
responsibility and the government did substantial work in 
that area, but "capital improvement programming" was weak 
or nonexistent, i.e., the timing of infrastructural work 
was difficult both in terns if sequencing and balancing. 
The growth of cities was not well planned or coordinated.* 
As an illustration of city growth, Jeddah had a growth 
pattern as follows: 
TABLE XI 
GROWTH OF THE CITY OF JEDDAH 
Year Area (hectares) Population 
1947 
1971 
1980 
63 
4750 
9700 
40,000 
381,000 
1,037,000 
Source: Sert Jackson (1980, p. 3) 
Land values were on the rise despite an increase in the 
supply of developable land. Centrally located land and land 
along transport corridors usually demanded higher prices. As 
an example, land prices in the central business district (the 
heart of downtown) in Jeddah were approximately 6000 riyals 
per square meter in 1971. In 1975 they reached 12,000 
*The "crazy quilt" pattern was especially evident in 
the capital city of Riyadh. 
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riyals per square meter and in 1980 they were estimated at 
32,500 riyals.* (Sert-Jackson, 1980). 
Since 1980, prices of land appear to have been 
declining in general, partly due to the expanding land 
supply. 
Labor 
As mentioned earlier, the indigenous work force was 
incapable of executing the development plans without 
assistance. This was due to several reasons: 
The qualitative requirements of the development 
projects were also mismatched to the available work force 
not only for professional white collar jobs, but also for 
skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled blue collar jobs. 
Additionally, a reduction in employment participation 
rates occurred during 1970-1980 for the younger Saudis 
(12-19 year-aIds) and the older ones (over 60 years). The 
former dropped from 37 percent of the work force in 1975 to 
21 percent in 1980~ most probably due to the availability 
of education and manpower training programs. The latter 
dropped from 51 percent to 46 percent of the work force 
from 1975 to 1980 respectively. (Ministry of Planning, 
1980, p. 37). This drop was probably due to the 
increasing wealth in the country. The Saudi indigenous 
*These estimates were based upon interviews with real 
estate agents, private developers, and municipality 
personnel. 
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working population declined from 72 percent to 57 percent 
of the total work force over the periods 1970-75 to 1975-
80. This reduction was indicative of the increase in the 
size of the work force rather than the declining 
participation rates. Table XII illustrates the magnitude 
of foreign labor needs. It should be noted that the 
figures actually understate the foreign labor presence 
because non-resident workers may be on "short" duration 
stay or they may be illegal aliens. 
TABLE XII 
RESIDENCE PERMITS ISSUED TO FOREIGNERS, 
KINGDOMWIDE 
1976 1977 1978 1979 1980 1981 
No. 424,227 522,085 606,403 687,274 66R,931 632,156 
Source: Central Department of Statistics, 1981. 
Overall employment grew at an average annual rate of 
3.8 percent over the period (1975-80) from a total of 
1,328,000 in 1970 to 1,600,000 in 1975. The rate of growth 
of the work force during the period of the second 
development plan was approximately 7.2 percent from 
1,746,500 in 1975 to 2,471,200 in 1980, (Ministry of 
Planning, 1980, p. 37) The average annual growth rate for 
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employment in the construction sector was almost 25 percent 
from 1970 to 1975--from 141,500 to 314,200. From 1975 to 
1980 the average annual employment growth in construction 
was 13.3 percent (Ministry of Planning, 1976; 1980). 
Data regarding proportions of Saudis to non-Saudis by 
sector.s was not available. However, it was expressed in 
several interviews that the construction sector had a very 
substantial proportion of foreign labor whereas sectors 
such as agriculture and general services had lower foreign 
proportions. 
Finally, Saudi labor unemployment was recorded as low 
as 2 percent in Jeddah in 1978 (Sert Jackson, 1979). This 
low figure is probably typical of other large urban areas. 
Materials 
The increase in demand for building materials led to 
delivery bottlenecks both for locally produced materials 
and for imported ones. Most of the construction material--
primarily cement: steel reinforcing bars, aggregates, 
lumber p etc.--was imported. The constraint in this case 
was mainly the port system and the road capacity and 
ability to deliver materials once unloaded in the ports. 
Table XIII below indicates the rate of growth of three key 
buildin3 materials importee from 1970-1980. 
The Kingdom's main ports of Jeddah and Dammam could 
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not handle the increasing cargo volumes until 1975-76 when 
ports productivity more than doubled allowing for relief of 
these constraints on all imported goods including building 
materials. 
Year 
1969 
1970 
1971 
1972 
1973 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
TABLE XIII 
GROWTH RATE OF MAIN BUILDING MATERIAL IMPORTS 
KINGDOMWIDE (1969-1980) 
Iron and Steel 
100 
95.9 
123.8 
153.9 
208.6 
340.9 
418.1 
1204.0 
2444.3 
2992.7 
4189.7 
4629.5 
Cement 
100 
76.2 
91.8 
55.6 
78.4 
291.1 
268.7 
933.9 
2214.7 
2396.7 
2277.2 
3391. 5 
Lumber and Products 
100 
86.8 
110.6 
106.0 
195.8 
294.8 
490.4 
2082.8 
2909.3 
2804.8 
3170.1 
3533.4 
Source: Central Department of Statistics, 1981 
The main building material, cement, was produced 
nationally by five privately owned companies: The Arab 
Cement Co. (Jeddah), the Saudi Cement Co. (Hofuf), the 
Yamamah Cement Co. 
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(Riyadh), the Quassim Cement Co. 
(Quassim), and the Saudi Bahraini Cement Co. (Dammam). 
Thp~e companies were expected to produce a combined output 
of 32.0 million metric tons of cement over the period 1980-
85. This represents about 47 percent of the total cement 
requirements for that time period as estimated by the 
Ministry of Planning (Ministry of Planning, 1980, p. 261), 
based upon projected construction activity. 
Capital 
Before the late 1930s, banking activities were limited 
to short term financing of imports, financing 
of local serviceoriented business, and accepting deposits 
(Nyrop, 1977, p. 226). In addition to banks, a few money 
changers operated primarily to handle foreign currency 
changes. In 1952, the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) 
was formed. This agency was to be the Saudi equivalent of 
a central bank. Its functions included regulation of 
banking, issuance and stabilization of currency, and 
general implemention of the Kingdom's monetary policy. The 
country's general business environment, which has 
traditionally centered on free enterprise, encouraged banks 
to participate in the Kingdom's development. In 1975, 
there were ten foreign banks operating in the Kingdom in 
addition to two local banks. These twelve banks had 79 
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branches throughout the Kingdom (Ministry of Planning, 
1980, pp. 2723). In 1975, a "Saudization" program was 
initiated by which the Saudi public could participate in 
the banking sector. Only banks that were half owned by the 
Saudi public could open additional branches. This led to 
the "Saudization" of foreign banks, public 
corporations were formed and half the shares were sold to 
the public. 
As oil revenues and the consequent government spending 
increased in the mid 1970s, lendi~g acti\ity did not 
exhibit a growth rate that was commensurate with the 
overall economic development of the economy. This may be 
attributable to several reasons: 
(1 ) The economy had a massive inflow of assets thus 
making the perceived need.for credit small during 
the earlier years. 
(2) The highest law in the Kingdom, Islamic law, 
disagreed with the use of conventional interest 
bearing loans including interest bearing 
mortgages.* Banks thus embarked upon "fee 
schedule systems" that served in lieu of 
interest. 
*In 1981 the Ministry of Justice ruled that interest 
bearing mortgages were a violation of Islamic law 
(Institutional Investor, November 1982). 
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(3) The "Banking Control Law" issued by Royal Decree 
(M/5, 1966) specifically prohibited banks from 
acquiring or leasing real estate except as 
necessary to conduct their own businesses and to 
house their own employees. If a bank acquired 
real estate to satisfy debts due, the bank had to 
dispose of it within three years ••• (Ministry of 
Finance, 1978, Article 10). The point here is 
that banks had no incentive to grant longer 
term loans, especially for housing, since they 
could not hold real estate as long term assets. 
(4) The banking sector, just as in other sectors, was 
unprepared for the sudden economic growth. 
Constraints on manpower, space, and know how made 
it difficult for the banking sector to respond 
fully to the greater demand for the medium and 
long term borrowing which emerged in the middle 
and late 1970s. 
On the other hand, the demand for credit was satisfied 
by specialized government credit institutions, one of which 
specialized in long-term housing finance and will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
As shown in Table XIV, the loan growth rate averaged 
a strong 47.8 percent, however, recent interviews with 
several banking officials indicated that long-term loans 
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were a very small proportion of total loans and that 10ng-
term loans for home purchases were practically non-
existent. 
The building and construction sector accounted for up 
to 22 percent of the bank credit in the late 1970s (Saudi 
Arabian Monetary Agencv, 1981). 
Building and construction technology was identified as 
a problem area, but not as important as the other 
bottlenecks mentioned. 
TABLE XIV 
LOAN GROWTH RATE, KINGDOMWIDE 
End of Hijra Year Loans(in Millions 
of Riyals) 
Percent Growth Rate 
1391 1694 
1392 1715 1.2% 
1393 2283 33.1% 
1394 4410 93.2% 
1395 6512 47.7% 
1396 9368 48.0% 
1397 9714 0.8% 
1398 13951 43.6% 
1399 25054 9.E.% 
1400 34199 36.5% 
Source: Central Department of Statistics, 1981 
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SUMMARY 
Several problem areas have been identified that 
directly impacted the housing sector. The requirements of 
the development plans induced changes in the demographic 
composition of urban areas. An inflow of migrants from 
within the country and abroad led to unprec~dented growth 
patterns. This in turn led to increasing demands for 
living space, the supply of which encountered bottlenecks 
in land delivery, labor, building material, and capital. 
The situation was exacerbated by the unavailability of 
enough financial instruments to reduce speculative 
practices in real estate. 
The context for Saudi housing policy was established. 
On the one hand, a socio-economic development framework to 
guide policy was identified in the Five Year Development 
Plans. On the other hand, a plethora of housing sector 
problems that needed to be solved were identified. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE SAUDI ARABIAN HOUSING POLICY 
Introduction 
This chapter will start with the explicitly stated 
housing policy elements. The housing goal, objectives--
including numerical supply and demand estimates, and 
criteria--will be discussed. The achievements of the 
individual policy elements in terms of "general" housing 
criteria will be reviewed first, i.e. the extent to which 
each policy element has been attained supplying housing 
units and/or in bringing housing prices down. 
The Goal 
The 
enabling 
decent, 
consistent 
The Housing Policy Elements 
Sa~di Arabian housing goal was 
" ••• every household in the Kingdom 
safe, and sanitary dwelling of 
with its level of income." 
expressed as 
to have a 
a standard 
(Ministry of 
Planning, 1976, p. 510). Even though there was no explicit 
timeline given, it may be assumed that the timeliness of 
the goal was crucial, especially that at its time of 
formulation a housing crisis was perceived to exist. 
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The Objectives 
Housing objectives were identified as follows 
(Ministry of Planning, 1976, p. 510): 
1. To insure sufficient dwelling units would be 
available for the additional manpower needed 
to develop the plan; 
2. 
3. 
To develop housing within orderly 
urbanization patterns consistent with 
social, economic, and environmental 
residential needs; 
To develop 
institutional 
an adequate, effective 
framework to supplement and 
support continuing efforts in housing 
development, e.g. financial and legal 
services, among others. 
Quantitative objectives were developed for the Second 
Development Plan (1975-80) and they were based upon 
estimates conducted for the General Housing Department in 
1972 as well a~ several regional estimates conducted for 
the Ministry of Planning (Ministry of Planning, 1976, P. 
510). The numerical objectives are expressed below as 
" D e man d " a lo n g wit h II Sup ply" est i mat e s by sec tor for the 
period 1975-80. 
The 117.0 thousand units listed under demand as 
substandard or dilapidated were not included as pivotal to 
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housing need for the plan period. Those units were just 
listed as candidates for replacement. 
TABLE XV 
ESTIMATED HOUSING NEED AND SUPPLY 1975-80 
Demand (OOO's Units) Supply (OOO's Units) 
181.0 New Households 122.1 Private Sector 
40.0 Accidental/ Public Sector 
Natural Losses 
221.0 Sub Total 
117.0 Substandard or 
Dilapidated 
338.0 Estimated Need 
32.5 Phase I 
15.0 Phase II 
5.0 Phase III 
51.0 Project 
(Temporary) 
44.3 Serviced Plots 
269.9 Estimated Supply 
Source: Ministry of Planning, 1976, p. 510 
As far as supply figures were concerned, the private 
sector numerical goal was to be achieved (or attempted) 
with the government providing various forms of assistance 
which will be discussed below. Project housing refers to 
housing funded by the government but built by contractors 
as part of the major development projects, e.g. military 
bases, hospitals, industrial complexes, etc. This also 
included temporary housing built for the contractors' own 
workers. 
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Criteria* 
The Second Development Plan (1975-80) included 
specific criteria for the housing programs. The criteria 
are summarized below: 
~ The Public Housing Clientelle: 
a. Efforts were to focus on low and moderate income 
households with target home ownership rate of 75 
percent. 
b. The housing income burden (plus utilities) was 
not to exceed 25 percent of income for low and 
moderate income groups, whether for loan 
repayment or rent. 
c. No illegal evictions were to be allowed. 
d. Conformity with government tenure agreements 
would be required for all government assisted 
dwellings. 
e. Income reviews of the clientel1e would be 
conducted to insure proper service provisions. 
f. Loss of head of household earner would be insured 
through the government. 
~ Housing Standards: 
a. All publicly financed or built housing would be 
*Sources: Second development Plan (1975-80) pp. 510-1 
and interviews with various officials. 
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standard or better quality and built in 
residential subdivisions. 
b. All subdivisions would conform to city planning 
regulations. 
~ Location: 
Areas of stable employment and a high demand for 
housing in urban areas were the conditions chosen 
for locating public housing. 
h Finance: 
a. For privately built housing, the source of 
financing was to be the Real Estate Development 
Fund, starting with 10 percent of the homes 
privately built in 1976-77 and increasing to 50 
percent in 1980. 
b. Public housing was to be financed through public 
funds, income from rents, loan repayments, and 
leasing agreements. 
c. Estimates of funds requirements were expressed as 
follows (Ministry of Planning, 1976, p. 518): 
Program 
Private Sector Assistance 
Public Sector Housing 
Public Sector Plots 
~ Housing Services 
Cost (Riyals) 
5140.0 million 
7350 million 
1722 million 
Housing services were identified in a very 
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broadly as providing households with t~chnical 
and legal advice related to the purchase, rental, 
and maintainence of their homes. 
Institutional Arrangements: Four basic institutional 
changes were made explicit: 
a. The General Housing Department--which up to 1975 
was part of the Ministry of Finance--was to be 
strengthened to become the Ministry of Housing 
with greater authority, responsibility, and 
budget to implement the public housing programs 
through regional 
organization was to 
offices. A 
be created to 
financing 
handle the 
financing needs for private sector housing. 
b. Encouragement of the private sector construction 
activity to ease entry into the housing sector in 
order to increase housing production. 
c. Development of a general "insurance Fund" to 
cover loss of head of household or accidental 
destruction of structure. 
Several comments regarding the above are in order: 
There existed no guidelines for defining income 
limits to separate low and moderate income groups from 
others. There was no historical precedent for "hire 
purchase" or installment agreement contracts. Finally, no 
mention was made regarding provisions for manpower 
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shortages, e.g. the General Housing Department had a staff 
of about ten people, of which only two were at the 
managerial level and the rest were technically oriented 
(SCET, 1975, p. A-VI-2) The manpower bottlenecks were just 
as serious in the public as they were in the private sector 
(which was briefly discussed above.) 
Heusing Achievements 
Public Housing 
The General Housing Department was strengthened and 
restructured to become the Ministry of Housing in 1975 
(Nyrop, 1977). Table XII illustrates the type, magnitude, 
and status of the Ministry's public housing projects. 
Compared with numerical targets specified earlier, public 
housing efforts have achieved approximately one third of 
its 52500 units goal. This result is based upon the actual 
completed units and the units in process, but exclude 
abandoned units, i.e. 12388 (complete and in process) + 
5041 (in process) • 52500 (original plan target over three 
phases) = 33.2 percent Achievement rate. 
Unfortunately, the results unde~state the problem. By 
the end of 1983 all public housing units were vacant, some 
since 1979. 
The following is a brief description of the individual 
public housing p~ojects: 
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TABLE XVI 
PUBLIC HOUSING PROJECT SUMMARY 
START/FINISH 
:P~R~OJ~E~C~T~(~L~O~CA~T~I~O~N~) ____ ~N~O~.~U~N~I_TS~ __ ~S_T~A~TU~S~ ___ ~ATES 
Existing Projects 
1. Low Income Housing 
"Candilis"(Jeddah, 
Riyadh,Dammam) 3250* Abandoned 1973/-
2. "Rush" Housing 
(Jeddah) 1996 Complete/Vacant 1977/79 
(Riyadh) 1152 Complete/Vacant 1977/82 
(Dammam) 1664 Complete/Vacant 1977/79 
3. "General" Housing 
(Jeddah) 3420 Complete/Vacant 1979/83 
(Riyadh) 5041 In process 1978/ 
(Al-Khobar) 4106 Complete/Vacant 1978/ 
TOTAL UNITS: 
units. 
12,338 units excludes in process and abandoned 
~ew Projects 
1 • Riyadh ( 3 • Sharq) 1258 In Process 
" (Land Development) 1956 In Process 
2. Mecca 2592 Not Started 
3. Medina 2084 In Process 
4. Biraidah 949 In Process 
" (Land Development) 1649 In Process 
TOTAL: 6,883 units plus 3,631 developed plots. 
1982/36 mo. 
1982/36 mo. 
1982 
1982 
1982 
Source: Ministry of Housing, interviews (1983) 
*Information regarding this early project was obtained 
from the report by SCET International (1975) and local 
interviews. Information may not be as accurate as it is 
for more recent projects. 
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1. The First Low Income Housing Program £i 1973* 
This program involved 3250 to 3500 units to be built 
in the major urban centers (Jeddah, Riyadh, Dammam, and 
Alkhobar) specifically for low income households. The 
projects involved using local contractors to build concrete 
structures in a flexible design so that inside walls may be 
removed to add space. The units were very small (80 to 120 
2 
meters) and built in a high density arrangement. This 
project was unfortunately plagued by land disputes, i.e. 
individuals claimed that part of the project site was 
theirs; another problem was the lack of utility lines in 
the areas chosen; and finally, several problems with 
workmanship were mentioned.** Due to increasing costs, as 
well as certain contractual ambiguities, the project is 
unfinished and abandoned. 
This program was authorized when housing was the 
responsibility of the Ministry of Finance (through the 
General Housing Department) and this was mentioned as a 
problem. According to one interviewee, the project 
falls outside the direct area of responsibility of the 
Ministry of Housing. However, in 1979 the Council of 
*In the 
Candilis/Aboul 
name. 
city of Jeddah, this was known as the 
Foutooh project because of the contractor's 
**These problem areas were identified through 
interviews with various Ministry of Housing personnel, 
private consultants, and SCET (1975, p. A-VI-5). 
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Ministers authorized the Ministry of Housing to supervise 
the completion of these projects (AI Moheet Al Saudi, 
November 64, 1980). 
..-. ~~~~.~~~, 
Figure ~ The Abandoned Candilis Project, Jeddah 
(1983) 
2. The Rush Housing Project of 1977 
During 1975, housing was recognized as a major 
constraint to the implementation of the Second Development 
Plan (1975-80). Specifically, foreign high and medium 
qualified personnel were viewed as one of the primary 
clientelle for new housing units (SCET, 1975, p. 1-1).* 
Many Saudi households were also viewed as a primary 
clientele that created a need for quality, durable housing. 
*Unskilled blue collar workers were considered to be 
tolerant of temporary housing arrangements such as barracks 
and shacks. 
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Severe shortages in the building sector and the housing 
sector were experienced. This led to increasing prices as 
well as a "filtering up" phenomenon, i.e. Saudi households 
were being displaced by foreign workers who were able to 
outbid them for the better housing units. A need was thus 
felt for an accelerated housing program. The demand 
support approach was considered to be inappropriate because 
of the existing bottlenecks in the market. A supply 
support strategy involving a rush (or crash) housing 
program which was to satisfy the following requirements: 
a. high quality, well constructed units 
b. the shortest possible construction time 
c. the least amount of disruption to the local 
housing sectors 
d. immediate access to utilities 
e. assuring comfort, privacy, security, and the 
Islamic way of life 
The Ministry of Housing embarked upon the ambitious 
project of constructing 1936 units in Jeddah, 1152 units in 
Riyadhi and 1664 units in Dammam, "as soon as possible, 
without compromising quality." (AI Benaa, 1979) The 
pro j e c t s we rei nit i ate dar' 0 u n d 1 9 77 and the com m 0 nun i fie d 
design was drawn in France (with Saudi coordination). The 
requirement of immediate access to utilities necessitated 
locating within the urban periphery resulting in a 
high-rise design. The living units included three bedroom, 
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and three bathroom, spacious (220 square meter) units. The 
design involved a platform upon which four eight-story 
"towers" were constructed. Each tower was complete with 
four elevators and four apartment units per story, a 
helicopter landing pad on top of every "tower" and a fully 
equipped bomb shelter. Construction was completed in 23 
months (for the Jeddah project). Figures 5 and 6 below 
illustrate the platform-tower design. 
It should be noted here that the {"ost of these "Rush" 
projects was phenomenal. Several issues seemed to have 
contributed to that: 
a. the speed with which construction was 
completed; 
b. the importation of almost all construction 
materials; 
c. 
d. 
the high quality of the buildings; 
the fact that the contractors and 
consultants were European (as opposed to the 
expensive far eastern consultant and 
contractors). 
The cost per unit was approximately 2106 million 
riyals for the 1936 apartment units in Jeddah. Cost data 
for the other two Rush Housing Projects in Riyadh and 
Dammam is not available, however it is not unreasonable to 
assume that they were c~mF3tdbly expensive. It should also 
be noted that the cost given above excludes land costs 
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which were also expensive. The Jeddah project, for 
example, occupied slightly under fifteen hectares on one of 
the main arterials wit~in the city. 
'. ~P'~'~"'t.~'.:R"~ ~"?~~;~.~" 
~ 
Figure ~ The Jeddah Housing Project 
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Figure ~ The Dammam Rush Housing Project 
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3. The General Housing Projects 
This project was unlike the Rush Housing in that it 
did not require an accelerated program of construction. It 
also did not necessitate the availability of pre-existing 
utility hook-ups and land availability was not as 
constrained as was the case for Rush Housing. The same 
basic design was utilized for apartments, but because of 
the relatively greater amount of land available, villas 
(detached single family dwellings) were also built in the 
2 
Riyadh Project. The former units were about 220m, the 
2 
latter 400m. The "general housing project" was also 
diffe~&nt in that it was located outside of the city 
periphery and it was to be based upon the neighborhood 
unit, i.e., schools, shops, hospitals, and other basic 
services were provided in the major projects. A 
significant difference between this project and Rush 
Housing is cost. Not only was the time frame not rushed, 
but construction utilized building materials available 
from local markets, i.e., less expensive local resources. 
Additionally, the contractors working on the projects 
themselves were from the far east (Korea) which were less 
expensive than the European contractors of the "Rush" 
* 
project. Finally, it should be noted that the General 
Housing Projects were initiated after the Rush Housing 
*The General Housing Projects still utilized European 
consultants. 
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Projeci:s, which reduced design and/or administrative 
errors. The cost for the Jeddah General Housing Project 
was still substantial at 1700 million riyals for the 3420 
units (excluding land). 
Figure ~ The General Housing Project, Jeddah 
Finance 
As mentioned earlier in discussing The Second Plan's 
housing goals, a new agency was to be formed to handle 
financing of private sector home building. The Real Estate 
Development Fund, REDF, was authorized in 1394 A.H. (1974 
A.D.) and started operation in 1975. It is a financial 
lending institution under the Ministry of Finance and 
National Economy. Its administration consists of a 
president, nominated by the Minister of Finance, and seven 
members--four from the Ministries of Finance, Housing and 
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Public Works, Planning, Municipal and Rural Affairs; and 
three members from the Saudi Public. In 1981/82 there were 
two hundred and seventy employees; 68 percent in financial 
and administrative departments, 16 percent in technical 
depa~tme~ts, and 16 perc2nt in various other areas. (REDF, 
1983) 
The REDF aims at helping to fulfill the Kingdom's 
quantitative and qualitative housing needs by provision of 
two types of loans: 
(1) Private Loans: Primarily targeted at low- and 
middle-income landowners for private housing 
construction. Loans do not exceed 70 percent of 
new housing cost or 300,000 riyals. Loans are 
long term (25 years) and interest free (later 
becoming negative interest). 
(2) Investment Loans: Provide landowners with 
interest free loans for multi-unit investment 
quality projects. Loans do not exceed 50 percent 
of the unit cost with an upper limit of 10 
million riyals. 
The Procedure by which loans are granted involves the 
fo110wing:* 
a. Providing proof of Saudi citizenship (only 
nationals were eligible) 
*Sources: 
officials. 
Loan applications and interviews with REDF 
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b. Proof of land ownership (land deed was to be held 
as collateral) 
c. Building permit and approved design plats from 
the local municipality 
d. Approval of the technical department of the REDF 
in the submitted plats 
e. For personal loans an advance payment of 10 
percent was to be made, followed by successive 
payments as construction progressed. Four 
payments were to be provided in total for the 70 
percent or 300,000 riyals. 
f. For investment loans, the same basic procedure 
applied, except that no advance payment was to be 
made and a total of five equal payments were to 
be advanced to the borrower, each after the 
completion of certain construction stages. 
Additionally, specific building specifications 
defined by the REDF technical department were to 
be met in order to receive payments. These 
involved floor area, setbacks, entryways, utility 
hookups, structural requirements, etc. 
Achievements. Tables XVIII and XIX illustrate the 
tremendous growth in the capital of the REDF as well as the 
lending activity over the period 1975/76 to 1981/82. 
*Sources: 
materials. 
REDF interviews and official application 
FISCAL 
YEAR 
1975/76 
1976/77 
1977/78 
1978/79 
1979/80 
1980/81 
1981/82 
FISCAL 
YEAR 
1975/76 
1976/77 
1977 /78 
1978/79 
1979/80 
1980/81 
1981/82 
TABLE XVII 
REDF CAPITAL AND INVESTMENT LOAN GROWTH 
Source: REDF 1983 
CAPITAL* HOUSING 
AUTHORIZED PAID UP , OF LOANS UNITS 
9000 5000 
23800 10503· !~~g 8223 
33800 19900 139 2043 
33800 24900 419 4534 
38800 30850 287 2276 
43800 38850 202 1738 
51100 43850 196 1546 
TABLE XVIII 
REDF PRIVATE LOAN DISBURSEMENTS 
Source: REDF 1983 
APPLI- DISBURSE- REPAY-
CATIONS MENTS VALUE* MIitIT~** 
34189 34189 8197 13 
46955 46955 13536 66 
30700 3832 955 221 
35303 34407 8690 437 
37016 33190 8185 1115 
36815 28593 6956 1070 
35572 31133 8052 1418 
*All values are in millions of Saudi Riyals. 
**These figures refer tc early repayment. 
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REPAYMEtlT** 
1 
10 
55 
91 
112 
174 
HOUSING 
1r!~U~ ~1r!nI 
41027 
56347 
4598 
41288 
39828 
34312 
37360 
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The sources of capital for the REDF are Saudi 
government allocations as well as loan repayments. 
Operational 
(expenses). 
funds mostly account for banking services 
In 1981/82 these funds reached 106 million 
riyals (40 million of which were for banking expenses). 
The personal loans were long term (25 years) with a 
two-year grace period. In 1980, two types of repayment 
incentives were enacted. The first was an on-time payment 
discount which rewarded borrowers who pay within one month 
of their due date with a 20 percent reduction of their 
installment. The second was an early payment discount of 
10 percent, i.e., the loan principal was to be reduced by 
10 percent if the entire loan was to be paid early. 
Investment loans were initially to be repaid within 
five years and they had a ceiling amount of 15 million 
riyals. In 1978 the ceiling was reduced to 10 million 
riyals, but the repayment period was extended to ten years. 
Investment loans were not limited to the construction of 
dwelling units, but also included office and exhibition 
(commercicl) space. The actual efficiency in terms of 
dwelling units per loaned riyal was 20360 (units) ~ 3299 
(million riyals) = 6.17 units per million riyal loaned. 
This figure was higher than for personal loans where the 
efficiency was 254,759 (units) 7 54,571 (million riyals) 
4.67 units per million riyal loaned. (These figures do not 
take into account the fact that a greater proportion of the 
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loan was needed in cash for the investment type loan (50 
percent) versus (30 percent) for constructing private 
dwelling units.) 
The loans indicated in the table were for the Kingdom's 
urban and rural areas combined. In 1981, an amendment was 
enacted that limited the riyal value of personal loans to 
200,000 riyals for small villages and rural areas; 250,000 
riyals for medium sized towns; and 300,000 riyals for major 
cities. 
As the tables indicate, there was a reduction in the 
number and value of investment loans beginning in 1979 due 
to the feeling by the REDF that the supply of housing 
complexes, office buildings, and commercial spaCE was 
becoming abundant enough to warrant a reduction. On the 
other hand, an explanation for the sudden decline in 
private housing loan disbursements from 46,955 loans in 
1976/77 to 4598 in 1977/78 (a drop of over 90 percent) was 
not directly available. The drop--it may be inferred--was 
not due to a lessened demand for loans, which was not weak 
at 30,700 applications in the fiscal year 1977/78. 
Up to 1979, it was expressed that no coordination 
existed Letween the REDF and other building sector 
elements such as the Minj,stry of Housing and the Real 
Estate Development Co. and the Municipalities, etc. (AI 
Benaa, 1979, p.89). However, the REDF utilized the 
assistance of the two largest local private banks (The 
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(The Riyadh Bank and The National Commercial Bank) whose 
branches throughout the Kingdom assisted in the loan 
provision as underwriters. 
The Saudi Real Estate Company 
This company was formed by a Royal Decree in 1976 with 
the following general goals: (SREC, p. 9, undated) 
1. To help satisfy the demand for residential and 
commercial space through construction; 
2. To conduct basic studies to improve building 
efficiency and consequently to achieve higher 
returns in real estate investments made by the 
Company; and 
3. To work toward ensuring availability of basic 
materials and equipment for building in order to 
avoid shortages of these materials which occur in 
the local markets. 
The capital of the company was set at 600,000,000 (six 
hundred million) riyals divided into six million shares of 
equal value (100 riyals) and owned by (Saudi Read Estate 
Co. Document, undated): 
0 The Social Insurance Organization 
0 The Public Investment Fund 
0 The Pensions Department 
0 The Riyadh Bank 
0 The National Commercial Bank 
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o Private Shareholders (2076 individuals) own 12 
percent of the stock. 
The company has its headquarters in the capital city of 
Riyadh. T .. ... ... employs close to 1,000 employees divided into 
three areas: ~'1nstruction and commercial works, 
administration, and planning and development. Projects and 
activities of the company since ic started operations in 
1977 include: (Saudi Real Estate Co., 1982) 
1. Importing of building materials and marketing these 
within the local markets based on cost and not on 
demand. Materials include steel, lumber, and other 
building materials. The company has also constructed 
warehouses totaling almost 10,000 square meters for 
its operations. 
2. Construction projects within the city of Riyadh: 
a. Al Sitteen Project: 103 residential apartment 
units; 
b. Al Solaimaniah Project: 136 residential 
apartment units; 
c. Al Morabaa Project: 78 residential apartment 
units; and 
d. Al Olaya Project:* Included 330 detached single 
*Only 
Apartments 
units. 
f amil y Villas, 1000 residenLial units 
(apartments). 
255 villas in this project have been completed. 
in the process of construction number about 675 
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The later project (AI Olaya) was a Planned Unit 
Development type project with a hotel and offices, 
included in the overall design. Projects in items (a) 
through (c) above were similarly planned to 
include office and/or retail space along with the 
residential units. Residential units were generally 
of good or better quality and aimed at the moderate or 
higher income earners. 
3. The compa'ly has achieved a profitable operation level~ 
In 1980 net profits before "zakat" (taxes) and 
miscellaneous distributions were almost 40 million 
riyals. In 1981, the figure rose to almost 75 million 
riyals. 
It should be noted that outside of the city of Riyadh, 
only one project--a "commercial complex" building in 
Dammam--was completed. 
The Saudi Real Estate Co. illustrates the fact that 
large scale housing projects may be constructed profitably. 
However, this company's efforts in residential construction 
have been, thus far, limited to the city of Riyadh. 
Building Materials Aids 
Government policy regarding building materials has 
occurred on two fronts. On the one hand, assistance to 
imports of building materials has been substantial in terms 
of favorable import duties and the tremendous port 
expansions discussed earlier, i.e. where ports were able to 
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increase productivity to accommodate the increases in 
demand for building materials, among other imported items. 
Regarding indigenous production of building materials, 
government assistance has been provided mainly through the 
Saudi Industrial Development Fund (SIDF), which was a 
government body responsible to the Ministry of Finance and 
National Economy, and was designed to promote development 
of private industry. Its primary activities have been the 
provision of interest free loans for up to fifty percent of 
capital needs and for as long as ten years. It also 
provided technical and administrative advisory services for 
its borrowers. A one percent to three percent loan fee is 
charged to cover administrative expenses. 
The fund was established in 1974 by Royal Decree and 
since then up to 1980, almost 54 percent of its loans have 
been to finance building material manufacturing projects. 
Building materials activities supported by the fund 
are summarized in Table XIX. Several items regarding the 
table need clarification. 
(1) The composition of building mate~jal projects 
over the years has reflected the changing 
technology. Increasing sectoral sophistication 
has been reflected in projects involving precast 
concrete, prefabricated buildings, and steel 
construction products. 
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(2) The "Number" columns in the table reflect new 
projects only whereas the "value" columns reflect 
new projects and expansions. 
(3) There existed a backlog in 1980 involving some 
nine applications in building materials 
(excluding cement and wood) and 997 million 
riynls. 
projects. 
There were no backlogs for cement 
Labor Aids 
One of the most important actions by which 
construction labor bottlenecks were removed was through the 
substitution of block visas in place of individual visa 
applications for foreign construction workers. Until the 
early 19705 the official procedures involved in obtaining 
a visa and a work permit were very difficult. The block 
visa quota was established to reduce the administrative 
burden on Ministry officials and to allow more foreign 
workers to enter the country. This applied to foreign 
workers in all sectors. Another important issue here is 
that foreign workers were not taxed. 
Regarding the indigenous work force, efforts were made 
to provide the necessary personnel to all sectors, 
including residential construction. These efforts manifest 
themselves in increased enrollment, both at the 
college/university and vocational levels. There were four 
universities offering technical disciplines including 
TABLE XIX 
SAUDI INDUSTRIAL FUND ACTIVITIES IN BUILDING MATERIALS 
1975/76 76/77 77 /78 78/79 79/80 
Cate~or:i No. Value No. Value No. Value ·No. Value No. Value 
Cement 350 4 863 
Wood I) Wood 
Products 4 12 4 31 3 6 6 2 8 
Other Building 
Materials 17 174 68 506 51 484 40 404 14 491 
Percent of 
Total Manu-
facturing 
Loans 33.8 53.1 53.7 43.0 42.6 64.9 36.0 41.5 33.3 67.9 
Source: Ministry of Planning, 1980 
Total 
No. Value 
5 1223 
13 63 
190 2059 
42.1 55.1 
..... 
0' 
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engineering and architecture. Enrollment in these 
disCiplines during 1974-79 was about 17,600 (Ministry of 
Planning, 1980). This figure actually overstates the human 
resources available for the residential and non-residential 
sector since the 
the broad array of 
category "engineering" 
the fields-- chemical, 
construction 
aggregates 
electrical, and mechanical engineering as \Yell as 
engineering management e 
Regarding vocational training, approximately 16,000 
employees completed on-the-job training in the private 
sector during 1975-80. Many of these, however, were non-
Saudis. Regarding public sector vocational training, an 
additional 20 facilities to supplement the existing 26 
facilities fer training is planned so as to achieve an 
enrollment of about 72,000 by 1985. (Ministry of Planning, 
1980) These figures also overestimate the available 
manpower for the construction sector because much of the 
training will be diversified to include industrial type 
work. 
Rent Control 
The rent control policy that was established in the 
Kingdom was viewed as a temporary measure to be lifted when 
the "housing crisis" was over and the country's housing 
projects were complete. A "general basis" agreed upon in 
the Kingdom was expressed as the freedom of contract 
between landlord and renter. The basic regulations 
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regarding controls were as follows (Saudi Regulations, 
Bulletin, 1979, 1980): 
(a) In 1975 the Council of Ministers limited rents 
increases to five percent above 1973 levels for 
existing units. 
(b) In 1979, for landlords who stayed within the 5 
percent allowable increase, an additional 15 
percent increase was allowed. For those who 
owned pre-1974 units and exceeded the allowable 
cumulative 20 percent (5 percent in 1975 and 15 
percent in 1979), adjustments to limit the 
increase to 20 percent retroactively were to take 
place. 
(c) In 1980, no rent increases were allowed on 
eXisting units (except for those mentioned in 
items (a) and (b) above) until 1983, when all 
rent controls were to be lifted. 
The effect of these regulatic~s on the housing market 
is not readily apparent. Housing starts appeared to be 
strong throughout the regulation period. 
Two issues remain to be discussed. One is the 
institutional setup of the private sector to deal with 
housing demand, and the other is provision shelter for the 
poor. 
Institutional Response 
The private sector accounts for most of the Kingdom's 
construction activity. 
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In 1973 there were 581 business 
establishments throughout the Kingdom involved in 
construction and building and employing 14,679 workers, 52 
percent of which were Saudis. By 1976 and in response to 
the increases in demand for 1ivi~g space, among other goods 
and services, the number of establishments increased to 
1347 employing almost 80,000 workers. (Central Department 
of Statistics 1981) In 1979, the number of firms was 1812 
employing 88,000 workers. (Central Dept. of Statistics, 
1981) 
Entry into the industry was apparently easy even for 
small firms. In 1976, 80 percent of all registered 
coustruction establishments had less than 50 employees and 
only 13 percent had over 100 employees. In 1976 the 
majority of large scale contractors (about 140 out of 215) 
doing work volume that exceeded 10 million riyals were 
foreign. Growth of the construction sector generally 
averaged 19 percent annually during the 1970s (Ministry of 
Planning, 1980, p. 255). In 1979/80 the industry 
contributed about 20 percent of the non oil Gross Domestic 
Product. Productivity in the sector grew by about three 
percent per year during the 1970s, according to Ministry of 
Planning estimates (Ministry of Planning, 1980, p. 256). 
The increase in responsiveness of the construction sector 
is illustrated by the fact that construction costs as a 
whole were not increasing as rapidly as construction 
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volume. (See Table XXI.) 
Year 
1974 
1975 
1976 
1977 
1978 
1979 
1980 
TABLE XXI 
CONSTRUCTION COST INDEX AND BUILDING PERMITS 
KINGDOMWIDE 
Index 
55.8 
69.8 
85.4 
98.1 
102.6 
104.7 
111.1 
% Change 
25% 
22.3% 
14.9% 
4.6% 
2.0% 
6.1% 
Building Permits 
27983 
44650 
67346 
70970 
58497 
63780 
83518 
% Change 
59% 
50% 
5.4% 
-17.6% 
9.0% 
30.9% 
Sources: Ministry of Planning, Internal Document, 1982 
Central Department of Statistics, 1979, 1980 
Notes: 
1. Building permits include construction, alterations, 
(renovations), and compound (or camp) walls. They 
thus inflate housing starts statistics since not all 
permits were executed. 
2. The construction cost index was constructed by a 
British consulting firm (Metr~ Consulting Ltd.) for 
the Ministry of Planning. It is based upon a British 
index whose coefficients were adjusted for Saudi 
Arabian technological differences. The index was 
updated by quarterly surveys in the major cities. It 
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is likely to understate the true increases to a 
certain extent because it relates to actual 
construction components irrespective of market effects 
upon tender lev~ls. The index figure for 1975 was 
85.6 and was believed to be in error so an adjustment 
was made by weighting regional indexes by the building 
permit proportions. 
3. The drop in building permits from 1977 to 1978 wee 
likely to be related to the contraction in activities 
of the Real Estate Development Fund in its fiscal year 
1977/78, where loans granted dropped by over 90 
percent. 
Entry 
understated 
construction, 
into the construction sector is probably 
because foreign 
usually with 
firms participated 
the assistance of or 
in 
in 
association with indigenous firms. It was not unusual for 
many indigenous firms to include foreign firms in the 
bidding for and later be responsible for the whole 
construction operation. Additionally, many Saudi Arabian 
individuals became their own building contractors in t~mes 
of very high prices. However, the figures for number of 
contractors is likely to be dampened by the fact that 
smaller firms may be registered in more than one trade, 
including residential construction, but that trade may 
experience little, if anys activity. 
Finally, the issue of institutional readiness (or lack 
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thereof) should address the public sector. This sector was 
experiencing manpower problems as great as, if not greater 
than those in the private sector. Shortages in manpower 
throughout the sector were compounded by a wage 
differential between public and private sector employment. 
It was not uncommon to encounter a 50 percent or more 
salary differential for the same type of job. The public 
sector wage structure underwent several changes throughout 
the middle and later part of the 1970s, but private sector 
wages were quicker to respond to changing conditions. The 
implications of these responsiveness issues shall be dealt 
with in the next chapter. 
Housing for the Poor 
Specific policies aimed at housing the poor in Saudi 
Arabia included the following: 
1. The First Low Income Housing Project £i 1973 
As mentioned earlier in this chapter, this project, 
comprising almost 3250 units in the major metropolitan 
areas, was abandoned and no plans as yet have been 
announced as to its fate. 
2. The Serviced Plots Programs i£L Land Grants Program) 
There were 44,300 serviced plots were to be 
provided to poor household Kingdomwide so that they 
can construct their own housing utilizing the Real 
Estate Development Fund Loan. This program was to lie 
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within the domain of the Ministry of Municipal and 
Rural Affairs and the respective municipalities. 
Delays in the program were experienced and Riyadh was 
the first city to start its serviced plot program. It 
recently granted several thousand plots at one site 
(Al Oraijah) within the city to low income 
households. It also offered assistance with 
architectural designs so that poor households could 
obtain Real Estate Development Loans and proceed with 
the construction. 
In the city of Jeddah, there were delays in 
completing and delivering the serviced plots to 
deserving low income households. Ten thousand plots 
were planned for in the newly developed South Jcddah 
area, but were incomplete in 1983. The site is a 
13~5 square kilometers of desert with lot sizes 
varying from 400-2500 square meters (Sert-Jackson, 
1980). Land grants for low income households 
generally include the following conditions:* 
1. That the applicant owns no other land or house; 
2. That she/he be a permanent resident of the city 
and a Saudi Arabian national; 
3. That she/he build on the land within four years 
of the grant; 
*Source: Jeddah Municipality Land Grant Applications 
and interviews, 1983. 
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4. That the grantee shall not rent; lease, or sell 
the lot (built or unbuilt) within five years of 
the grant; 
5. That building will be in accord with an approved 
building permit from the municipality of Jeddah. 
Another means by which low income households could be 
granted land is through the Crown or the Royal Cabinet 
grant. Any individual Saudi national could apply for a 
parcel or plot of land from the government, and many 
applications were to the King himzelf. However. this State 
Land Grant system was not specifically targeted at the low 
income population, and it is not known how many low incone 
households were impacted directly or indirectly, e.g. 
thIough filtering. 
In 1980, a Royal Decree ordered the termination of 
agricultural and residential land grants except for those 
people who have not been granted land before.* This Royal 
Decree limited the extent of the Grants program. 
Housing Through Charitable Institutions/Individuals 
In the city of Jeddah, several privately funded 
"housing for the disadvantaged" projects exist. These 
housing structures are usually purchased and operated by 
*Source: Journal of Saudi Regulations, 1980 ([ing 
Abdul Aziz University). 
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charitable organizations and/or individuals.* They have 
existed in the Western Province and in Islam for many years 
and the coming of the oil wealth has contributed to their 
expansion and renovation. The endowment houses 
(Roubat)typically house the elderly and the very poor 
irrespective of nationality. Some have operating 
subsidies paid by the Ministry of Pilgrims and Endowments 
to cover items such as utilities and some supplies. 
Another organization that includes aid for the Arbitah is 
the Al Faisaliah Women's Charitable Cooperative in Jeddah. 
This cooperative performs a range of charitable and 
social functions including supervision of 16 Endowment 
houses scattered throughout Jeddah, housing about 1120 
people including 360 children. Dwelling conditions range 
from very poor-- needing better electric service, better 
plumbing, refrigerators, cooling fans or air conditioners, 
and cookers--to very good, well furnished facilities. The 
number of residents vary from seven (Roubat Al Lami) to 64 
(Roubat Ali Nasseef) and an exceptional Roubat (Bin 
Mahfouz) housing about 800 individuals. 
The Bin Mahfouz project represents a successful 
attempt by the private sector to house needy low income 
households. Bin Mahfouz is a very successful cnd well 
*The basis of this chdrity is sheer altruism and 
r~li~io"S principle; There are no tax advantages to 
operating these homes. 
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respected Saudi businessman who set up the Roubat close to 
his home. It was constructed in 1979 and consists of 
three high-ri~~ buildings containing 288 apartment units of 
moderate quality and with 80 square meters each. These 
units house. free of charge~ about 800 low income 
individuals, including 400 children, Residents are 
provided also with a single daily meal (lunch) and given a 
food in-kind aid every three months. Utilities are also 
provided free of charge (limited telephone service is 
included), as is free emergency medical care by a night-
time, resident physician. Only one supervisor is 
responsibile for three buildings and--based upon a site 
visit--it appears to be an efficient operation. 
The construction costs for the three high-rise 
buildings were approximately 45 million riyals in 1979. 
Operating expenses average approximately 80 thousand riyals 
per month, or roughly one million riyals per year. One of 
the interesting facts about this project is that it 
receives 
provided 
Charitable 
little support from the government. Funding is 
by the project's owner, by the Al Faisaliah 
Cooperative, and by charitable acts from many 
individuals. 
Another p.xample of a large scale cooperative housing 
project provided by a non-profit organization, illustrates 
that construcLion costs on relatively large housing 
projects do not necessarily have to be as expensive as the 
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public housing projects. The Prince Fawaz Cooperative 
Housing Project was started in Jeddah in 1974-75 by 150 
people from the University of King Abdul Aziz. Land was 
donated by the Government. The project grew to 1,500 
members, but encountered land disputes and administrative 
difficulties. Additionally, the initial contractors 
charged with building the project, a Spanish 
contracting firm, abandoned the proje~t midstream. The 
project had to be redesigned and is summarized on page 130. 
The project utilizes precast construction techniques 
and is of very good-to-superior quality. The project is 
expected to be complete by the end of 1984 (100 units were 
already complete in 1983, but infrastructure and utilities 
were incomplete). Finally, an application to purchase 
involves a fee to become a co-op member, which is applied 
towards the horne (10,000 riyals) and there is a group plan 
by which all owners can automatically receive REDF funding 
for 300,000 riyals if they are eligible. The following 
highlights the project: 
Total Land Area 
Design 
Number of Units 
A~ticipated Population 
5.73 million meters 
PUD including 9 kindergartens 
6 elementary schools 
2 high schools 
6 supermarkets, etc. 
Approximately 1500 
Approximately 10,000 
Plot size 
Unit design 
Construction Cost 
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2 
900 m 
Semi Detached Villas, 2 stories 
2 
Large Villa area, 435 m 
Medium Villa area, 408 m 
2 
Small Villa area, 361 m 
2 
Approximately 1100 riyals to 2361 
2 
riyals per 1!I * 
Housing Policy for the 1980s 
1. Demand 
Demand estimates for urban areas within population of 
30,000 or more ws estimated to be 450,000 units (Ministry 
of Planning, 1980, p. 448). This figure includes new 
household formation, replacement of substandard units, and 
replacement due to accidental losses. Overall demand 
(including rural areas) was estimated to be 730,000 units. 
2. Supply 
Public housing is expected to provide 10,000 units in 
new projects. These include the 6883 units mentioned in 
Table VIII under the title New Projects. There is also 
mention of a special housing project to specifically 
"assist lower income households to find adequate housing" 
(Ministry of Planning, 1980, p. 449). Indeed, the whole 
focus of the public housing program appears to be directed 
towards low income households. To identify exact needs, 
*Sources: Interviews with Project personnel, and the 
consulting firm in charge. 
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Figure ~ The Bin MahFouz Endowment (Roubat), Jeddah 
Note the differences in size, capacity (800 versus 11 
residents), clientele (families in Bin Mahfouz, women 
in Al Khounji), quality of construction and location 
Khounji is in the Central Business District whereas 
Mahfouz is in a less congested section of town). 
only 
(AI 
Bin 
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Figure 10. The Al Khounji Al Sagheer Endowment (Roubat), 
Jeddah 
~... ,: .~ .... fL· . 11>' • L. ~. , ' .. ..--.- • 
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Figure 11. Prince Fawaz Cooperative Housing Project 
TABLE XXI 
PLANNED HOUSING SUPPLY ESTIMATES 1980-85 
Private Sector 
REDF Personal Loans 
REDF Investment Loans 
Non REDF Construction 
Sub Total 
Public Sector 
Ongoing from 2nd Plan 
New Projects 
Special Housing Project 
Government Agencies Employees Housing 
98,000 
5,000 
78,000 
181,000 
6,193 
10,000 
7,000 
53,800 
76,993 
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Serviced Plots 14,800 
TOTALS 257,993 units and 14,800 serviced plots 
Sources: Ministry of Planning, 1980 and Ministry of 
Housing interviews. 
two housing studies were to be conducted to document 
Kingdomwide and urban housing conditions. Additionally, 
the serviced plots program was to proceed but with only 
14,800 rather thar. the 44,300 plots envisioned under the 
second plan period. (Ministry of Planning, 1980) 
The private sector is expected to construct 181,000 
units in the period 1980-85. 
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Of this figure, 54 percent 
are expected to be constructed through REDF loans. A total 
of 13,816 million and 805 million riyals will be available 
for personal and investment loans respectively, subject to 
market requirements. Total quantitative needs and supply 
are listed in Table XXI. 
Several issues regarding the above should be noted: 
1. Under public sector programs, the first item, "Ongoing 
projects," represents the 1152 Rush Housing units in 
Riyadh which were already completed in 1982 and the 
5041 units in Riyadh started in 1978 (See Table 
XVI). 
2. The new public housing programs include the 6883 units 
mentioned under new projects, also in Table XVIII. 
3. Information is limited regarding the "Special Housing 
Project," except that it is to be a low income housing 
project dispersed over several smaller urban areas 
within the Kingdom. 
4. The Government Agencies Employee Housing involves 
various ministries and agencies and specific 
jr.formation about the projects were unavailable. As 
mentioned before, this figure represents public sector 
housing (for government employees) which should not be 
confused with public housing (for lay citizens). 
Summary and Discussion 
The housing policy achievements compared to the 
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Kingdom's expressed housing goal and objectives may be 
summarized in the following: 
1. Regarding the broad housing goal of attaining a decent 
home for every household in the Kingdom, achievements 
fell short. The socioeconomic survey mentioned 
earlier for the city of Jeddah indicated a 40 percent 
home ownership rate among Saudi Arabian families. 
Additionally, almost half of all the buildings in 
Jeddah were in fair condition (requiring some form of 
repair) or worse. 
A caveat regarding the above is in order. Most 
data are from a survey conducted in 1978, only three 
years after the beginning of the Second Development 
Plan. It is likely that an improvement in the home 
ownership rate as well as building conditions could 
have occured due to rising incomes and reductions in 
housing costs since that time. 
2. The quantitative objectives set for the private sector 
achievements (122.1 thousand units) were actually 
exceeded; 150 thousand units were completed from 1975 
to 1980, a 123 percent achievement rate. 
Private sector assistance through the REDF and 
other measures, as mentioned, were provided by the 
government. 
3. Project housing achieved a 100 percent achievement 
rate (51,000 units). 
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4. The public sector low income serviced plots program, 
scheduled to provide 44,300 plots, had a zero 
achievement in the five year period 1975-80. However, 
in the early 1980's several thousand serviced plots 
were said to have been distributed in Riyadh. 
Interviews in 1983 indicated that distribution of 
10,300 serviced plots in Jeddah was "nearing 
completion." 
5. Information on public housing projects was not readily 
available. However, as indicated in Table XVI, 12,338 
units were completed by 1983. There were 5,041 units 
in the process of construction in the city of Riyadh. 
Even if these latter projects are completed soon and 
counted as achievements, the sad fact remains that all 
units were vacant as late as Harch 1983. 
Additionally, even if the units were not vacant, the 
cost was substantially higher than private sector 
dwelling units, for example, the Jeddah General 
Housing Project, which was recently completed, 
utilized local building resources and a longer time 
frame than the costlier Rush Housing Project. It cost 
about 1700 million riyals for 3,420 units, or 
approximately one half million riyals per unit. The 
space per unit is approximately 220 square meters 
which brings the cost per square meter to roughly 2273 
riyals/square meter. This cost element does not 
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compare favorably with per meter construction costs in 
the city of Jeddah, which range from 1100 
riyals/square meter for ~economy" units to roughly 
2200 riyals/square meter for "standard" quality to 
3000 riyals/square meter for Il very good or luxury 
quality villas.* The units in the public housing 
project would likely fall in the category of economy-
to-standard. 
The Prince Fawaz Cooperative Housing Project in 
Jeddah is perhaps more accurate to use as a basis for 
cost comparison by virtue of its size. This project 
was mentioned earlier in this chapter. Its cost 
per square meter, despite a definite sllperior quality, 
ranges between 1100 to 1361 riyals per square meter.* 
6. The list of accomplishments for public housing 
included 53,600 units completed in the period 1975-80. 
(Ministry of Planning, 1980) This implied an 
achievement rate of 102 percent, i.e. Public Housing 
quantitative goals were 52,500 as identified earlie~ 
in Table XVI" • However, 
terminology problem here 
there 
because 
appears 
public 
to be a 
housing 
programs--as used in this dissertation--do not include 
government agency employee housing and military 
housing. Official figures apparently aggregate public 
housing along with public sector housing. 
*Based upon interviews with project personnel. 
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7. Institutional set ups to support housing development 
as envisioned in the statement of housing policy 
objectives e.g. financial and legal services, have not 
been effectively developed as yet. It is not clear 
who has the authority for defining, constructing, and 
implementing these institutional structures, i.e. 
whether those structures would be within the domain of 
the Ministry of Housing, the Ministry of Planning, or 
the local governments (basically the municipalities). 
8. Housing assistance from the public sector specifically 
directed at the poor was relatively weak. Private 
sector contributions, however, were relatively 
substantial. 
9. Apparently, no studies were conducted to identify low 
income households--their numbers, locations, and 
housing needs. A need for these studies was 
mentioned in the Second Five Year Plan. (Ministry of 
Planning, 1980, p. 449) 
One of the most important findings is the large 
effectiveness gap that exists between public and private 
housing construction. The private sector, with government 
support, has shown a capability to respond to conditions of 
rising demand with a considerable degree of effectiveness 
as reflected by the number of housing units constructed 
over the documented period (1975-80). Public housing 
projects have been, as the record indicates, historically 
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troubled. Billions of riyals have been spent on 
miscellaneous projects which have to this date (1984) been 
unoccupied. Furthermore, the low income land grant program 
has not been successful. These results do not necessarily 
reflect on the intentions and/or the capability of Ninistry 
of Housing personnel. Institutional elements probably have 
the greatest effects, as well as manpower shortages. 
One of the most important outcomes of the poor 
performance of public housing is that the sector of society 
that bears the greatest burden is the less advantaged one, 
i.e. low income households. These householdswere to be the 
beneficiaries of public housing, and are deprived the most 
due to the delays and/or indecisiveness about"who will live 
where" problems of public housing. Society as a whole may 
be worse off considering the increases in building cost in 
the public housing projects over and above similarly 
constructed private sector housing. These increases 
represent wasted societal resources unless enough quality 
differences exist to warrant the additional cost, and upon-' 
site visits, public housing projects were found to be of 
high quality. Comparisons with private sector housing is 
difficult due to a general lack of building codes and 
recent data on housing conditions. 
In summary, the greatest potential for improvement is 
identified in thos0 poli~y components that involve direct 
involvement in the housing sector by the public sector, 
namely public housing and the land grant program. 
programs achieved a greater degree of success. 
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CHAPTER V 
HOUSING POLICY EVALUATION 
Introduction 
Two bases of evaluation are presented in this chapter. 
The first involves the individual policy outcomes based 
upon the Kingdom's own housing goal and objectives. The 
second basis draws upon the theoretical framework developed 
in Chapter II, which dealt with rationales of housing 
policies. 
An evaluation of housing strategies is also presented; 
including supply and demand support strategies. Finally, 
institutional structure will be discussed. 
Evaluation Based On Objectives 
In the previous chapter, outcomes of the various 
components 
discussed. 
of the Saudi Arabian housing policy were 
These outcomes are summarized along with the 
objectives for each policy component in Table XXII. 
Based on the stated objectives, the most effective 
policy component was private sector housing construction. 
The private sector was aided by the government in areas 
such as building material subsidies, labor assistance 
measures, and home financing subsidies. Achievements were 
TABLE XXII HOUSING POr,ICY OBJECTIVES AND ACHIEVEMENTS 
Policy Component Objective 
1. Private 
Sector 
Housing 
2. Real 
Estate 
Develop-
ment 
Fund 
Financing 
3. Land Grant 
program 
For Low 
Income 
Households 
122.1 Thousand 
Units 
Stimulate 
demand 
for housing 
44,300 
serviced 
plots for 
the needy 
by the public 
sector 
Achievement 
150.0 Thousand 
Units from 
1975-80 (a 
123% rate) 
Personal loans 
numbered 
212,299 and 
investr.lent 
loans were 
2,682. These 
financed 
approximately 
275,000 units 
over the period 
1975-82. 
0% up to 1980. 
In 1983 units 
were supposed 
to be distri-
buted in the 
city of Riyadh. 
Comments 
Private sector government assistance 
included direct building material sub-
sidies and indirect subsidies through 
seaport expansions, which relieved 
bottlenecks in material delivery. 
Assistance was also provided to human 
resources by providing some training 
for local workforce and by facilita-
ting immigration procedures for foreign 
work force. Demand support subsidies, 
primarly REDF financing, was another 
form of assistance. 
Activities were limited to new homes 
only and loan eligibility required 
land deed as security for the loan. 
A potential problem was that there 
were no strong incenti.ves to encourage 
early loan repayment 
An adverse effect of the low achieve-
ment was that the REDF loan program 
became income regressive, i.e., the 
Land Grant and the REDF activities 
were supposed to be in tandem. Un-
availability of land made poorer 
households who did not have land 
unqualifien for REDF loans 
!-' 
~ 
o 
TABLE XXII (Continued) 
policy Component Objective Achievement Comments 
4. Public 
Housing 
5. Project 
Housing 
6. Saudi 
Real 
Estate 
Company 
NOTES: 1) 
2) 
32,500 units 
for Phase I; 
20,000 for 
Ph3ses II 
and. III 
51,000 tem-
porary type 
units to be 
constructed 
by large 
contractors 
for their 
employees 
To help 
alleviate 
housing 
shortage; 
No ouanti-
tative 
objectives 
were set. 
All objectives are as 
Achievement dates are 
12,33B units 
completed by 
19B2 excl'Jding 
abandoned and 
"in process" 
units. A 25% 
achievement 
rate 
100% achieve-
ment rate in 
the period 
1975-80 
Several hundred 
residential 
units were com-
pleted in the 
city of Riyadh 
by 1983. Pro-
fits reached 
5B million 
riyals on in-
come of 87 
million in fis-
cal year 19B1. 
identified in the 
as noted. 
There has not been a single housing 
unit that has been inhabited thus 
far. public housing units have 
also cost more thansimilar units 
constructed by the private sector. 
All completed units are in the major 
metropolitan areas of Jeddah, 
Riyadh, Dammarn, and Khobar. 
Residential building activity of 
good quality but confined to the 
city of Riyadh. 
Second Development Plan 1975-80. 
I-' 
~ 
I-' 
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impressive. In terms of numbers, a 123 percent rate of the 
objective was achieved during 1975-80. Since 1977 Housing 
costs, have stabilized and declined (see Table V). The 
costs of housing are actually not well represented by the 
index, because quality is not taken into consideration. If 
new units are of better quality than old units, the cost 
index will overstate true cost increases. Data on the 
quality of housing units was not available for the whole 
Kingdom. However, based on information available for the 
city of Jeddah. it is safe to assume that new housing is of 
better quality than old housing in attributes such as 
structure, internal space, ventilation, and access. The 
implication of the above is that a portion of the cost 
difference between new housing and old housing is likely to 
be due to quality differences. 
The issue of private sector responsiveness to housing 
demand cannot be fully analyzed because there has not been 
an investigation of the supply elasticity of housing. 
However, certain elements indicate that a responsive 
private sector is not an unreasonable expection. These 
include the rate of entry of firms into the construction 
sector. the extent of government assistan~e providing 
building resources to the housing sector, and the lack of 
rt::::;Li~C\..J.UI1::; 
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Direct public sector involvement in housing through 
public housing ~nd the land grant program were the least 
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successful components of housing policy in terms of meeting 
housing objectives. As mentioned earlier, problems of 
higher costs and delivery reduced the effectiveness of 
public housing efforst. Several implications of these 
problems need delineation. 
The effectiveness gap between the public and private 
sector implies that resource utilization could have been 
improved had the private sector been more involved in 
public sector projects. As an example of this reasoning, 
the Rush Housing Project was, as mentioned earlier, built 
to relieve the housing shortage in the Kingdom during the 
mid 1970s. The project was to house middle-income and low-
income households in the shortest time possible and with 
the least disruption to the already bottlenecked resource 
markets. Farahat and Cebeci (1982) evaluated the project 
and found that it could have utilized a design and 
development strategy that would have been more effective in 
terms of integration into the community, better design 
acceptance. and in construction management if local firms 
had been involved. Specifically, they compared an 
incremental phased development--approach to the "large 
lump" approach, with low-rise -··:",.er than high rise units, 
and a scattered rather than a concentrated approach. As a 
result, an actual savin~s in time--from making the design 
decision to occupancy--would have 
affecting the number of units. 
resulted while not 
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This analysis addressed design and efficiency issues. 
It did not address the fact that land for the "Rush" 
project was scarce and that the project required pre-
serviced land with all utilities included. Furthermore, 
the Ministry of housing did not view the local cOLstruction 
firms as being sophisticated enough to handle such a large 
project, especially since earlier experience with the low 
income public housing project of 1973 set an unfavorable 
precedent. However, those characteristics by themselves do 
not justify the cost differentials and the fact that the 
units are vacant. The vacancies can be attributable to 
institutional problems in that no institutional structure 
for distributing and administering public housing exists, 
such as a public housing authority. Additionally, the 
establishment of criteria for identifying deserving 
clientele for public housing has not been done. 
Clientele selection is a problem that exists for this 
and other public housing projects. Even if consensus is 
reached that the units be given to low income households, 
there is a problem in identifying who are the appropriate 
qualified groups. 
Another potential problem is that of equity. Solomon 
(1974) identified the cuncept of vertical equity as the 
extent to which households of unequal status are treated 
equally. Horizontal equity was identifed as the extent to 
which households of equal status are treated equally. Even 
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if low income households are identified and given units in 
public housing projects, they would end up in higher 
standard housing than some of the lower middle income 
households, and the project would be vertically 
inequitable. Additionally, if the housing projects do not 
house all the poor households who are in equivalent levels 
of poverty, it would be horizontally inequitable.* 
In addition to public housing, the other direct public 
sector involvement in housing was the land grant program 
which was to provide serviced plots--with all utilities 
provided--for low income households. This program 
encountered conceptual and outcome problems. The idea of 
having large tracts of land subdivided specifically for low 
income plots has the potential of segregating a given city 
by income and social class, and poses the threat of 
establishing low income enclaves. Information regarding 
the eXisting degree of income or other segregation within 
the cities in the Kingdom was not available. However, if 
the assumption is made that housing pkolicy should aim at 
reducing segregation, the criticism becomes a valid one. In 
terms of outcome, delays in the land grant program not 
only prevented low income households from obtaining laod, 
but it also made the activities of the Real Estate 
Development Fund (REDF) regressive. The very poor, who 
*Horizontal equity was also referred to earlier as the 
"Lottery" feature in Chapter II, under "Public Housing." 
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could not afford to buy land, could not obtBin the 
subsidized home loans because of the requirement of having 
title to the lanJ. However, some of the poor households 
received benefits from other social programs, including the 
Crown Grant Program. 
The Saudi Arabian Real Estate Company was successful 
in building housing units, as illustrated by their 
quantitative and financial achievements. That success was 
limited geographically to the city of Riyadh. 
The final housing component to be dealt with is the 
financing activities of the Real Estate Development Fund. 
As mentioned before, this organization was the only one 
that provided long-term home financing in the Kingdom. The 
absence of mortgage financing was due to the laws 
forbidding usury and the charging of interest, as well as 
the relative unsophistication in the lending activities 
performed by banks and other financial intermediaries. 
Additionally, a regulation which prohibited banks from 
holding real estate as an asset affected the loan 
situation. Finally, difficulties in assessing homes and 
real estate in general made real estate financing even less 
likely. 
The REDF appears to have been effective in inducing 
housing starts. According to REDF data, over 90 percent of 
the housing units built in the period 1975-8U REDF 
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financed homes.* This need not imply that all the units 
built were due to the loans. Some would probably have been 
built anyway. The loans, however, were granted for new 
homes only, and therefore investment in existing homes was 
not stimulated. Those had to be purchased either by 
outright cash or by using short-term (1-5 year) loans which 
could not be turned over, as is the case for some types of 
variable rate mortgages. A potential problem area for 
continuing REDF activity is capital availability. Capital 
was to be provided by outstanding loan repayments and 
government allocations. Personal loans were granted for 
personal housing--as opposed to investment loans, which 
included rental housing as well as commercial and office 
space. 
The personal loans had a 25-year t~rm with a two-year 
grace period, a zero interest rate, and a 20 percent 
discount for on-time payments and a 10 percent discount on 
early principal payment. Investment loans had identical 
conditions, but that they involved a ten-year term. Loans 
were not transferable upon home sales. These conditions 
imply that the annual capital available for the REDF is 
dependent on: 
o Outstanding personal loans 
o Outstanding investment loans 
*Sources: REDF Seven-Year Report and Third 
Development Plan (1980). 
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o Early repayment due to financed home sales 
o Early repayment due to "altruism" 
o Government allocations 
"Altruism" refers to repayment incentives that are contrary 
to rational economic judgement and involv~ 
well-being toward expanding the loan base 
potential borrowers. 
feelings of 
for other 
The preceding statement implies that more and more 
government funds will be required to sustain the growth 
rate of loan disbursements by the Real Estate Development 
Fund unless incentives are provided to accelerate early 
repayments. Thus far, ten percent of the outstanding loan 
balances have been repaid. 
A case can be made at this point for instituting a 
financing arrangement for eXisting homes. This would 
represent an incentive to encourage investment in the 
existing housing stock as a demand support policy directed 
at existing homes. It would also ht!lp to expand the REDF 
loanable capital if the loans for existing homes are not as 
generous as they are for new homes, i.e. stimulating sales 
of existing homes would stimulate early repayment due to 
financed home sales, which is a determinant of capital 
availability for the REDF. If the loans are based on the 
same terms as those for new homes, the effect will be a 
shifting of loanable funds from new to existing homes. 
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Evaluation Based On Theoretical Framework 
In developing a general theoretical framework for 
government support of housing in Chapter II, equity and 
efficiency rationales dominanted other bases of housing 
policy. This section will utilize primarily these two 
bases for the evaluation of priorities. 
rationales will also be discussed. 
Eguity 
However, other 
In terms of equity, which refers here to a "fair 
distribution of adequate housing," housing policy in the 
Kingdom has not been very successful. The least privileged 
households were the ones that received the least benefits. 
The failure of public housing to provide units for the low-
income households and the delay in the land grant program 
skewed the benefits of the policy toward middle and upper 
income households. As discussed earlier, in Chapter III, 
a normative basis in Islam stresses "equitable" income and 
wealth distribution. Even though no specific criteria 
exist to define "eqUitable," it is apparent that the poor 
and disadvantaged should receive a larger share of the 
growing wealth in the housing sector than has been the 
case. The general notion of housing equity applies both in 
the provision of "minimally acceptable" s.helter to the 
needy groups and also in response to the normative, 
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traditional basis of equity identified in an Islamic 
context. 
Efficiency 
In addressing the efficiency rationale identified 
earlier, two issues arise. The first is that of building 
sector efficiency and the second, capital market 
efficiency. An evaluation of the Saudi policy in terms of 
the former, concludes that government assistance to the 
private sector through building material subsidies, through 
labor assistance measures, and financing measures did in 
fact achieve effective results as reflected by its 
achievement rate. Other measures of achievement include 
the decline in construction costs and housing costs. 
The issue of capital market efficiency is difficult to 
address. Capital markets, or markets dealing in the supply 
and demand of long-term loanable funds, did not and still 
do not exist. The reasons were discussed earlier are due 
to the lack of sophistication of the financial systeQ, 
partly due to the prohibition of interest charges in 
conformance with Islamic principles, and banking 
regulations. The activities of the Real Estate Development 
Fund represents a quantum leap forward in terms of house 
financing in the Kingdom. Over ninety percent of the homes 
built in the 1975-80 period were financed by the REDF, 
according to official figures. This, however, need not 
imply that 90 percent of the homes were built due to the 
REDF. There is still potential for improvement 
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by 
expanding the financing scope for home loans to include 
existing housing. 
Spatial Aspects 
The stated objectives of the Saudi housing policy were 
to concentrate housing where demand was greatest. Housing 
was not used as part of a regional growth center strategy 
instrument. 
As far as intraurban spatial aspects are concerned, 
public housing and serviced land grant location policies 
encouraged segregation. The segregation by income and/or 
region that was likely to result can have many unfavorable 
effects, including dissatisfaction, feelings of alienation, 
and overall area stagnation. 
Macroeconomic Effects 
The first low-income public housing project in 1973 
depend on local contractors. It was said to have suffered 
from quality problems which justified use of foreign 
contractors for the much larger projects that were built 
later (SeET, 1975). The 4,812 unit Rush Housing Project in 
the three metropolitan areas of Jeddah, Riyadh, and Dammam 
was designed to be built in a very short time span and did 
not use local contractors or building materials, so as not 
to disrupt the already constrained local markets. The 
12,567 unit General Housing Project was started when 
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constraints on the building sector were viewed as being 
less severe. Local building materials were utilized, but 
the magnitude of the projects cumpared to the available 
local resources necessitated utilizing foreign contractors, 
consultants, and workers on a "turnkey" project basis. As 
a result, macroeconomic stimulation cannot be claimed as a 
significant result of these public housing projects. 
Private housing starts share a similar record as far 
as employment effects were concerned, i.e., employment 
benefits were likely to be small due to the inability of 
local manpower to execute the construction requirements. 
As an induced effect of government stimulation of private 
housing, increased incomes for local building contractors 
and landlords resulted. This, however, is an income 
distribution issue. 
Public housing projects appear to have had very weak 
macroeconomic effects in terms of employment and possibly 
moderate effects in terms of income generated. Private 
housing efforts, which were aided by the government, were 
likely tv have fared better in terms of income generated, 
especially given the dominance of real estate in personal 
investment portfolios: Employment effects due to private 
housing were not likely to be significant due to the 
conditions of full employment eXisting in the Kingdom. 
Internal and External Effects 
As the literature review indicated, the empirical 
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evidence reviewed was inconclusive as to the effect and 
magnitude 
health. 
of improved housing on mental and physical 
However, the literature, for the most part, 
cases. The value of this rationale addressed United States 
for other countries, especially less developed ones, was 
doubtful given the mediating effect of cultural variables 
in influencillg outcomes of housing improvement. Another 
complicating factor was that no agreed upon levels of 
"substandard ness" were established to judge likely outcomes 
according to minimal standards. 
In Saudi Arabia, three positive internal benefits of 
housing improvement were viewed as likely. The first is 
mental and physical benefits due to environmental factors, 
including the availability of air coolers, which would 
moderate the difficulties associated with the very warm 
climate. This effect is not necessarily restricted to new 
housing, but 
improvements. 
involves the 
incorporates a broader issue of housing 
A second likely effect is psychological and 
expectations of increases in standards of 
living, given the increase in income and wealth ~hat the 
country has experienced. The third effect may be viewed as 
the creation of options to change from extended to nuclear 
families if a given household desires the change. An 
implicit assumption here is that a housing improvement will 
include provisions to accommodate this change. This effect 
m3Y be viewed as a "mixed" effect. It is positive because 
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of the potential for comfort that it provides, but it may 
be negative in that it destroys some cultural elements in 
the Saudi society. 
Given the complexity of the interaction of 
"satisfaction" and "adaptation" variables, internal 
benefits will be difficult to delineate within the scope of 
this dissertation. 
The argument also holds for the external benefits of 
housing improvements in the Kingdom. Development Plans 
called for growth in all sectors of the economy, such as 
education, health, transportation, etc. It would be 
difficult to disentangle the spillover of housing onto the 
other sectors. 
Blockbusting and abandonment practices have not been 
reported as yet, but this may be an indication of timing 
rather than absence, i.e., in some areas in Jeddah, several 
neighborhoods (AI Sabeel and Al Ruwais) have experienced 
declining conditions and rentals due to the changing 
clientele inhabiting the area.* The new residents are 
mostly foreign workers. It is not clear as yet whether 
blockbusting practices are involved. No abandonment 
problems have been observed in the city of Jeddah. 
A final, but important issue related to external 
benefits of housing is the visibility factor and its 
*Based 
personnel. 
on interviews with Jeddah Municipality 
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political effect, i.e., the visibility of successful 
housing projects is likely to improve the image of a given 
political system. In the major cities of Jeddah, Riyadh, 
and Dammam, the visibility factor was actually a 
disbenefit. The Rush Housing Project Towers, standing 
complete and vacant within the city proper, have 
contributed negatively to the image of public housing 
policy. 
Strategies Evaluation 
The earlier efforts by the government in realizing 
housing objectives were primarily supply support oriented. 
The immediate aim was to eliminate resource bottlenecks and 
help the private sector achieve greater production. The 
strategy was viewed as necessary by the government because 
the housing objectives greatly exceeded what the indigenous 
resources could provide. The strategy could be divided 
into indirect and direct supply support. The former was 
manifested in miscellaneous resource subsidies for the 
private sector. It appears to have been successful in 
inducing supply responses from the private sector. The 
strategy may also be partly responsible for reducing 
construction costs through the subsidies and the general 
support for the private sector provided by the government. 
Direct supply support, in the form of public housing, 
has not been successful in achieving the objectives in 
terms of the number of units built, their costs and their 
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delivery to eligible households. Resources were not 
efficiently utilized in direct supply support. The Rush 
Housing Project commanded a substantial cost premium 
because of the speed by which it was built, but all units 
have been vacant for many years after their completion, 
thus defeating a central purpose of the project. 
Additionally, according to an analysis of the project 
conducted earlier, the design could have been drawn and 
planned in such a way as to allow for the utilization of 
more local resources and yet maintain the project's 
construction speed. The conclusion from the above is that 
resources have been inefficiently utilized in executing the 
Rush Housing Project. 
The General Housing Project does have cost drawbacks--
although no~ as severe as the Rush Housing Project. It is 
more expensive than comparable private sector housing. Also 
it appears to have problems in delivery. Thus 
clientele has been selected for this project. 
far, no 
Public 
housing in general appears to have been unsuccessful on the 
two bases discussed earlier. If public housing is viewed 
as a means to house the poor because of market 
imperfections, it has not achieved that objective~ Indeed, 
there are doubts that any publ~c housing can eff~ctively 
house the poor because of the inherent lottery or 
horizontal inequity feature, i.e., the housing benefits are 
usually provided to a limited proportion of the eligible 
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households. If public housing is viewed as a means to more 
effectively utilize resources for building, then here again 
it cannot be evaluated as being successful. Resource 
utilization has been apparently more effective in the 
private sector, especially when assisted by the government 
through subsidies. 
Demand support strategies, primarily REDF activities, 
have been successful in stimulating housing starts, but 
there is a great need for expanding the scope of lending 
beyond new housing. This expansion would have several 
benefits including the preservation and upgrading of the 
existing housing stock, promoting the capability of 
households to buy homes, and, a possible increased 
repayment rate for REDF funds. The timing of increased 
financing efforts is also of importance. The financial 
system in the Kingdom should have attained a higher level 
of sophistication and it is also accessible to more urban 
and rural areas. The financial system should be viewed as 
a resource to affect a wider range of housing programs. 
Constraints, however, do exist and are serious enough to 
warrant public sector efforts. Specifically, there exists 
no capital market and the charging of interest is frowned 
upon by religious authorities. 
Two possibilities exist to achieve a wider scope of 
financing. The first involves utilizing the already 
specialized operation of the Real Estate Development Fund. 
The second involves 
including the Islamic 
encouraging 
banks, to 
the existing 
participate 
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banks, 
in the 
mortgage lending activity. Encouragement by the government 
would include an insurance scheme for long-term loans such 
as the FHA progam which started in the 1930s in the United 
States. It would also include minimizing regulatory 
effects which p~ohibit banks from long-term lending in real 
estate. 
The issue of interest on loans, which is not allowed 
within an Islamic context, is beyond the scope of this 
study, however possibilities do exist as illustrated by 
Islamic banks' interest free operations. Additionally, the 
new mortgage instruments beyond the simple fixed-rate 
long term self amortizing loan can be evaluated for 
applicability to the normative setting. 
Institutional Structure 
Another issue to be evaluated is the housing 
institutional structure. The first low-income housing 
project of 1973 was initiated when the Ministry of Housing 
was the General Housing Department under the Ministry of 
Finance and National Economy. In interviews cond~cted to 
determine why the project was unfinished, it was mentioned 
that the project was not the responsibility of the Hinistry 
of Housing, but "belonged" to the Hinistry of Finance. The 
latter ~Iinistry in turn claimed that responsibility for the 
project wan with the Ministry of Housing. In trying to 
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determine why the existing public housing projects are 
vacant, it was suggested that the Ministry of Housing is 
the implementing body. It does not set policy, but only 
implements objectives. Responsibility for identification 
of public housing clientele and for delivery of the housing 
units was not made clear. Specialized committees for 
public housing were to deal with these issues, but these 
committees were not within the Ministry of Housing. 
the time of conclusion of the research for 
Up to 
this 
dissertation in 1983, formation of a public housing 
committee was ongoing. The vacancies in the public housing 
housing units could be explained as being due to two main 
reasons. First, no criteria for identification of the 
public housing clientele was available. Second, 
responsibility for the identification of the clientele and 
the delivery of the units is unclear. 
Finally, a distinction has to be made regarding the 
housing policy environment. The earlier housing policy 
efforts were short term oriented, designed to overcome 
specific housing problems which were resource constraints 
and the lack of living space to accomodate migrants. In 
the long run, as more resource bottlenecks are relieved and 
supply becomes relatively uninhibited, new policy 
directions may need to be taken. Specifically, policies to 
promote affordability of homes will be needed. Housing 
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policy in the long run would have to take into 
consideration the impact of reductions in the numbers of 
foreign workers and the resulting vacancies that are likely 
to result. Failure to do so will not only result in a 
potentially drastic contraction of the real estate market, 
but also threatens to affect other sectors directly and 
indirectly, such as building, contractiEg, furniture, 
appliances, etc. Even in the absence of cyclical downturns 
in the economy. an awareness that overinvestment in huusing 
can result in the housing sector versus other sectors if 
subsidy programs are not eval~ated. 
Conclusions 
Private sector activities in housing, when assisted by 
the government in the provision of resources, were very 
effective in achieving stated housing policy objectives. 
Public housing was generally ineffective in achieving 
the predefined housing objectives, and was also 
ineffective as judged bi the theoretical framework which 
emphasizes equity ond efficiency. 
Regarding strategies of housing support, it was found 
that indirect supply support by the government through 
resource subsidies was successful in stimulating housing 
construction. Direct supply support through public housing 
projects have not been successful when judged by the 
Kingdom's own housing objectives and when evaluated within 
the equity and efficiency rationales. 
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Demand support strategies~ primarily the Real Estate 
Development Fund (REDF) financing activities, were 
successful in achieving a very significant proportion of 
privately constructed homes. Another demand support 
strategy was the land grant program. This program was not 
successful due to delays and potential segregation 
problems. 
Finally, the issue of housing the poor was not very 
effectively handled. The status of public housing and the 
delays in the land grant program were the main reasons why 
policy outcomes did not provide housing for the poor. 
Recommendations 
One of the most important issues that requires action 
is the provision of housing assistance to the poor. It is 
recommended first that the poor, eligible households be 
identified, i.e., a poverty line be identified as a 
starting point. Possibilities for housing the poor could 
include utilizing part of the existing public housing 
projects and/o~ earmarked cash transfers. 
Another recommendation is that a decision about the 
public housing units should be reached as soon as possible. 
One possible solution is to auction the units in the open 
market. Another possible solution is to allocate the units 
to government agencies for employee housing. 
Regarding home finance, it is recommended that a wider 
scope of financing instruments be considered. This would 
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provide an incentive for maintaining the existing housing 
stock as well as being a potential source of capital growth 
of the RDEF. 
The clear assignment of responsibilities to different 
public sector institutions involved with housing is 
recommended. This measure would lessen bureaucratic 
inertia involved with decision-making and it would also 
allow for easier evaluations of progress and achievements. 
It is recommended that demand support policies be 
given greater consideration. A greater reliance on private 
sector activity appears favorable due to that sector's 
demonstrated effectiveness, as well as its being more in 
conformity with the traditional norms of the country. 
A long run perspective of housing should consider the 
need for additional and more affordable units as well as 
the potential effect of cyclical downturns in the economy, 
which could have very negative effects on housing and other 
linked markets. 
Finally, the thesis brings to attention the need for 
additional and better information on the number, condition, 
tenure, and type of housing within the Kingdom. The 
general nature of the thesis will hopefully inspire 
additional research and study in the areas that are 
addressed. Specific areas include an empirical 
investigation of housing supply responsiveness, 
applicability of long term mortgage instruments to the 
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Islamic setting, the establishment of applicable housing 
codes, and the appropriate institutional structure for 
allocating and managing public housing projects. 
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I~terviews 
June 1982 to March 1983 
a His Excellency (H.E.) Deputy Minister of Housing, 
Riyadh 
o H.E. Regional Director of Ministry of Planning, Jeddah 
a H.E. Regional 
Projects/Jeddah 
Director of Ministry of Housing 
a V.P. Planning, 3audi Real Estate Co., Riyadh 
o Chairman of the Board, Saudi Real Estate Co., Riyadh 
o Director General, Real Estate Development Fund, Riyadh 
o H.E. Deputy Minister of Planning and National Economy, 
Riyadh 
o V.P. National Commercial Bank, Jeddah 
a V.P. Saudi Investment Bnd Banking Company, Jeddah 
o H.E. Deputy Municipality Director, Jeddah 
a Representative, Al Faisaliah Charitable Organization, 
Jeddah 
a Regional Director of the Ministry of Endowments and 
Pilgrimage, Jeddah 
o Manager of Bin Mahfouz Endowment Buildings, Jeddah 
a Manager of the Prince Fawaz Cooperative Housing 
Project, Jeddah 
o Office Manager for the 
Administrative Affairs, 
National Economy, Riyadh 
Deputy Minister 
Ministry of Finance 
for 
and 
a Director of the Department of Information and Follow-
up, Ministry of Planning 
a Director of the Research Section, Ministry of Planning 
0 Engineer in Charge of Low Income Land Grants, Jeddah 
Municipality, Jeddah 
0 Planning Officials, Sert Jackson International Ltd., 
Jeddah 
0 Engineer, Al Mabani Construction Company, Jeddah 
0 Project Manager, F.A.S.T., Prefabricated Homes 
Construction, Jeddah 
Notes: 
(1) Some interviewees, not listed above, expressed wishes 
for anonymity. 
(2) Site visits were conducted to public housing projects in 
both Jeddah and Riyadh. 
(3) Site visits to Endowment Housing were limited to the 
city of Jeddah. 
